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NAIVE REALISM AND ILLUSIONS OF REFLECTION

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When a person perceives, nothing new comes into existence: the perceiver is aware of a physical object which existed before he was aware of it. What is new is the awareness, which is not a new *thing*, nor does it produce or create a new thing. The word "sense-datum" is, therefore, misleading because it refers to the content of perception as though it were other than the material thing, which is the object of the perception. Even if it does not refer to a new event, a fresh occurrence, as its Lockean or Berkeleyan counterpart, "idea", fairly obviously did, the sense-datum tends to separate the quality sensed from the physical object perceived, suggesting that sensing and perceiving were not exactly the same single act. The sense-datum has among modern philosophers lost much of its countenance but has not, for some reason, been dispensed with altogether. Even when the term itself is not used, some equivalent is retained, like the adverbial use of the word "sensing": here, when we sense blue, for instance, the world blue qualifies *the way* we sense, *not what* we sense. Even when this is not the case, the traces of the sense-datum terminology can still be seen in the ambiguity the term has stamped upon the word "perceive": it has so wounded the word that, even after the term's removal, the sundered parts have remained separate.

I wish to confine myself in this paper to one single use of the word "perceive", the cognitive use. According to this use of the word "perceive", whenever we say we perceive something, there is a physical object actually existing whose qualities are immediately given to the perceiver. This use of the word entails naturally that no distinction be made in the status of the senses in their relation to the physical world: they are all equally in touch with it and the qualities they make us apprehend are all

equally real. The perceiver, according to this view, is directly aware, in every mode or species of perceiving, of the physical world. All perceivers are aware of the same physical world. There is no private content of perception, no sense-datum peculiar to each perceiver: there is nothing subjective in perception but the awareness of each perceiver.

This is the naive realist view. According to this view, perceiving is an activity: this accounts for the fact that "seeing", "hearing", "smelling" and "tasting" are all verbs. The logic of these verbs, however, is different from that of certain other verbs like "playing" and "running", where the objects of these verbs do not signify anything other than the actions themselves; the objects have been called "internal" accusatives: a race that is run is nothing separate from the particular action or set of actions that are done in effecting it; it is the same with playing a game. In seeing a house, however, or hearing a tune, the objects of the acts are "external" accusatives, and cannot be defined in terms of the actions themselves: the former are independent and exist separately from the actions. Or so it is, according to the naive realist thesis. According to the Berkeleyan view, however, the object that is perceived is always an *idea*, its *esse* is not to be conceived apart from the individual act of the perceiver that constitutes it. This is so also in the sense-datum theory of perception, though, as Professor Ayer complains, the adherents of this theory do not always conform to the conventions that govern the usage of the term sense-datum. In naive realism, where perceiving is a species of *knowing*, the object apprehended is, by definition, independent of the perceiver and his acts of perceiving. According to this view there is no distinction between sensing and perceiving, between the content and object of perception. The perceiver in perception is brought into direct contact with the real world: what he sees, hears, touches, smells and tastes is the world as it is. The colours he sees, the tactual qualities of things he feels, the smells and tastes he apprehends, are qualities of the world; the sounds he hears occur in the world: nothing is subjective.

What is proposed in this paper is not, strictly speaking, a *proof* of the naive realist thesis. It is, however, a partial vindication of the thesis, if one is able to defend it successfully against the argument from illusion which historically deposed it. Professor Ayer, in his book, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*,¹ does not consider the Argument from Illusion a

¹ Chap. I.

disproof of the naive realist thesis. He thinks that the thesis could maintain itself, if it were prepared to introduce suitable conventions with regard to the variability of material things. If the naive realist admitted that material things existed only for a moment and could not be seen by all people, he could account for the phenomena of hallucination. If he said the stick in water had changed its shape, *was* crooked and not merely looked crooked, he could take in the facts of refraction; and in order to explain why distant objects look small, he could say that physical objects grow larger as the observer gets nearer.

This is not the way in which I propose to vindicate the naive realist thesis. To do so in the way suggested by Professor Ayer would be, in fact, to destroy it, to alter it so radically that it would no longer be itself. It would contradict the naive realist definition of a material thing to postulate that material things existed only for a moment and were private to a single perceiver. To say that the stick was actually bent in water would be to contradict the naive realist view that it was the same stick that was being felt and felt to be straight; lastly, to say that material things grow bigger as the observer gets nearer them is to contradict the naive realist view that material things and their qualities do not change in relation to the perceiver.

To defend naive realism successfully we have to show that the qualities apprehended in all the different perceptions of the object do not contradict each other: we should be able to combine the information supplied by the different acts of perception into one consistent whole. If we do this, we give support to the belief that the object perceived is independent of the perceiver: it truly does not change, is self-consistent, though the observer himself changes his point of view and the conditions under which he observes alter. If we succeed, we have proved, on inductive grounds at least, that material objects exist, that the *esse* of them and the *esse* of their qualities do not depend on *percipi*.

In this chapter I shall confine myself to a few of the common "illusions" of sight. I shall take the phenomena of reflection in particular and show that the information supplied by "images in mirrors" is consistent with that offered by the so-called normal perceptions. Many present-day philosophers, notably Mr. G. J. Warnock,² hope to return to the common-sense view of perception without dealing in full with the problem of illusions. We cannot answer the objections that Berkeley raised against the naive realist thesis unless we deal with this problem. To Berkeley, if

² In his *Berkeley* (Pelican).

some quality was really inherent in an object, the object must necessarily have that quality under whatever conditions it was perceived: to him, one implication of naive realism was that the qualities of objects were independent of the perceiver. The phenomena of illusions, which "showed" that the qualities of things changed when the conditions under which they were perceived were altered, was sufficient proof for Berkeley that naive realism was wrong. I think the only way to answer Berkeley is to show that illusions can be explained or interpreted in terms of the naive realist thesis in the sense in which he himself understood the thesis. The only British philosopher I know of who has tried to do this is Mr. R. J. Hirst (*vide* his article in *Mind* 1951, entitled "Perception, Science and Common Sense"). Mr. Hirst has, it is admitted, only partially succeeded and there are serious omissions in his paper. He hardly refers to the problem of reflections, which is one of the most difficult "illusions" that naive realism has to explain. This problem is the main subject of the present paper, though some other minor illusions have also been taken up for explanation.

Let us, then, take the facts of reflection; these though some common-sense philosophers do not think so, prove to be the most intractable of the "illusions". Mr. R. J. Hirst, in the article I referred to above, rests content when he says that mirages have been shown to be instances of reflection: he seems unmindful of the fact that reflections themselves and the problems posed by them are among naive realism's greatest difficulties. Professor Prichard puts the difficulty thus: "No body, if seen, can present the appearance which a body similar but reversed as regards right and left can present, nor as regards its relations to other bodies can it present an appearance similar to that which a similar body differently related to these bodies would present It is useless to appeal to the special nature of the physical conditions in the case in question, for example to the way in which the light rays go, for the difficulty is concerned simply with the nature of what we see in the proper or 'mental' sense of see, and has nothing to do with what we see in the physical sense of what affects our eyes." Then he asks, "How if we see a body can it look other than what it is?" and he answers, "If we press this question home to ourselves we can only answer that it cannot."³

This is not, however, the main difficulty, as I shall show later on. The major difficulty is the illusion of space and physical objects within it that seems to be created, a space which cannot be

³ *Knowledge and Perception*, pp. 53-4.

fitted in with what other observations show us to be the physical space in which the real objects are. When I look in the glass, I see a world of objects behind the glass. If I try to move into this space by walking through the glass, I find that I am prevented. There is a real space behind the glass, of course, which I can see and move into, if I remove the glass, but this space is not peopled with the objects I saw "in" the glass. The space I see when I look in the glass seems to be an entirely perceptual space; it appears to be continuous with the space in front of the glass but it really is not. It is, in short, an illusion.

In order to avoid confusion between the space and world *behind* the mirror, into which I can move when the mirror is removed, and the space and objects I see when I look in the mirror, I shall speak of the latter as the space *within* the mirror. This is, of course, only a temporary verbal expedient, for the objects seen in the mirror are not within the mirror considered as a physical thing, as the material glass could be said to be; and part of the problem for the naive realist is to give an explanation of the phrase "within the mirror" and relate the space therein with actual physical space.

Confronted with the problem of reflections, people have said that the space "within the mirror" is illusory: it cannot be fitted in with the space they see in front of the mirror and behind it. If we examine the reasons why people assert that the space and objects "within the mirror" are illusory and not the space and objects in front of the mirror, we shall find that the judgement is not made on the basis of seeing: the space in front of the mirror and the space "within it" are both equally seen. It is usually said that we can touch the objects before the mirror while we cannot touch those "within it"; and here, as often, touch is brought in as the final arbiter of the real. I shall try to show that in this case touch really does not act as the final arbiter of the real. We certainly do touch the objects "within the mirror" when we see ourselves do so in the mirror. And if it is objected that we feel the hardness of the object *here* (in front of the mirror) and not *there* ("within the mirror"), I would ask the reader to consider whether this is really the case and what is actually meant by "here" and "there". When we decide that the object is in front of the mirror, this is decided on the basis of sight: when we say the hardness of the object is *here*, meaning "in front of the mirror", the "here", since we are looking at the object, is defined in terms of where we see it. If we are not looking at the object and were defining "here" in terms of touch alone, we would have to say the hardness is where the object is

touched and this definition, it is obvious, is of no use in deciding whether the object is "here", in front of the mirror, or "there", "within the mirror".

If where the object is is decided on the basis of *seeing where it is*, then, since we also see it "within the mirror", it is equally there. If the reader concentrates sufficiently on what he sees "within the mirror", he will certainly feel the hardness of the object there, where the object is "within the mirror". Touch alone by itself only affirms, of the spatial situation of an object, that an object is where it is touched; if we touch other objects close by, touch can affirm that the first object is among such and such others. This definition cannot, as we stated above, help us to decide whether the object is "here", in front of the mirror, or "there", where the reflection shows it to be. The spatial location of an object that touch gives us alone by itself is of such a kind: "object A is among such and such other objects, between objects B and C, D and E", and so on. This information applies equally correctly, as I shall show in detail, to the spatial location of an object seen in a mirror and that of an object seen in front of it. The sense of touch, therefore, cannot be brought in to settle the dispute as to whether the object is *actually* in front of the mirror or "within it".

The other senses, like hearing and smell, even taste, may now be summoned to defend the reality of the things in front of the mirror; but equally, like touch, they fail to establish the claim. The smell of the object is where the object is and where it is appears "within the mirror", when we concentrate on the reflection, and before the mirror, when we give heed to our observations of what is in front of it. It is the same with taste and the sense of hearing. Each sense separately by itself only establishes, of the spatial location of the object, the limited, tautologous, claim that the object is where it is sensed, and this information cannot throw light on where the object is as perceived by another sense. If it is now claimed that we take our location from ourselves, our own bodies, and that they at least are not "within the mirror", it can be pointed out that our bodies are equally perceived objects among others and can also be seen in mirrors. Our senses apprehend our own bodies in the same way as they do other objects. The reader may now appeal to the sense of pain which puts our bodies into a rather special position: surely pain and the other sensations we feel in our own bodies give us indication of where our bodies are. To this we reply that though pain and other localized sensations give us a sense of where *in the body* they are, they do not help us to decide where

the body is among other objects, whether it is, for instance, in front of the mirror or, as the reflection shows, "within the mirror".

It may finally be argued that we cannot get into the space "within the mirror" and that, if we ignore that it is an illusion and try to do this, we shall bump our heads severely to remind us of our folly. In reply to this we say that we are already in the space "within the mirror", when we observe ourselves there, and that it is in trying to get out of it into the space in front of the mirror that we bump our heads against the mirror! If anyone observes his "reflection" as he bumps against a mirror, he will notice that his reflection too has bumped its poor head, and this contact seems equally painful, to judge from its wry face and the shame-faced rubbing of the forehead.

The reader, by now, may think that I am playing a joke on him and by specious argument trying to convince him of what is obviously untrue. It must be remembered at this point that I am not trying to prove that it is the space in front of the mirror and the objects contained in it which are illusory. I am only trying to show that the space and objects "within the mirror" are equally real. This may give the reader no satisfaction, for he may indignantly conclude that, if this is so, it may equally be said that both spaces are equally unreal. It is this extreme conclusion that was recently drawn by the philosopher H. D. Lewis — forced upon him, in fact — in his paper "Private and Public Space".⁴ This was also, in fact, what happened in the history of philosophy, and the conclusion, forced upon them by other illusions also, which the philosophers of the past went on to draw, was that the entire sensible aspect of objects was private, consisting of subjective ideas, and not physical at all. The consequences to the history of philosophy were far-reaching: a host of fictitious problems arose which torment philosophers in one form or another to this day.

Let us assume that the reader is not intimidated and returns to the attack with another argument. He may say that one consideration which proves that the space "within the mirror" is illusory is the fact that it has no continuity with the space he moves into, when he turns his back to the mirror and walks away: the space he now walks into forms a continuum only with the space that was in front of the mirror. This argument may seem to be conclusive; but it is not a fair argument at all, for the reader by turning his back to the mirror, nay, even by turning his eyes

⁴ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. LIII.

from it, is prevented from seeing what the mirror has to show him. If he tossed his head back or had eyes at the back of his head, he would certainly see himself walking further and further into the space "within the mirror" as he walked away from it. Since he cannot always do this, another observer looking into the mirror could inform him that the space which was in front of him, prior to his turning his back, and the space he is now walking into, after he has done so, do form a perfect continuity.

Our hypothetical reader may still argue that it is absurd to think that mirror reflections are as real as what is mirrored, for the simple reason that they can be created at will and that they do not exist when no mirror is present. Though this is true, it does not give an answer to the puzzle that, when a mirror is introduced, it brings into being objects so real, that they satisfy any or all the criteria of reality which can properly be applied.

With this final consideration all arguments must cease, I believe, which try to prove that the space and the objects "within the mirror" are illusory. The arguments, some may wish to say, are double-edged and, if they prove that the objects "within the mirror" are illusions, they have proved that the objects in front of it are also illusory. It is not necessary, however, to assert this, because the arguments have actually failed. What is interesting is the fact that the arguments which establish the reality of the things in front of the mirror, (arguments which, if formulated, are of the following kind: "I see them or touch them or taste them and therefore they are real"), can equally be applied to mirror reflections.

What, then, are reflections? Are they other, real objects? Is it to this paradoxical conclusion that our arguments bring us? At this point let us turn to what physicists tell us, that the objects in the mirror are "reflections" of the objects before it, and that these reflections are caused by the bending at the surface of the mirror of the light rays which go out from the objects. We thus see in the mirror not new physical objects, nor illusory sensible objects, but the *same* objects that exist in front of the mirror. This is what the scientific account takes for granted: it is also what ordinary people certainly take as true, if we are to trust ordinary language: we say, "I saw myself in the mirror" and not "I saw an illusion", or "I saw another person who resembled me". Philosophers and ordinary people when they philosophize, however, have for certain reasons not been satisfied with this description. Most of them have rejected it for erroneous reasons; for example, on the ground that the objects in the mirror, though available to sight, cannot be touched, smelled,

tasted or heard. These reasons have, I hope, been amply demonstrated to be false. The only reason that is valid is the failure hitherto to explain, if the reflections are the same objects as those seen in front of the mirror, why these same objects appear to be in two places at the same time. An additional difficulty, which to my knowledge does not appear to have been suggested by anyone, is, if the reflections are the same objects as those in front of the mirror, how we are able to see the same objects *twice* at the same moment.

This, the seeing of the same objects twice, is what actually occurs if we take for granted, as ordinary language certainly does, that, when we see reflections, we see the objects themselves. At this point a trifling objection may arise, that in reflections we usually see sides of the objects other than the sides we see directly. This does not make the problem any different, because it is assumed that all the sides seen are sides of the same objects; and, besides, it is actually possible to see the same side both directly and reflected: for instance, pressing our fingers against the mirror we can, with our head on one side, see the palm of our hand both directly and in the mirror. These two, then, are the difficulties in the problem of reflections which the theory of naive realism has to answer: firstly, why do the same objects appear to be in two places at the same time, and, secondly, how are we able to see the same objects twice?

Before we answer these questions let us summarize the position regarding the status of reflections which we have already reached. Reflections are not illusions: when we see a reflection we perceive the same object that we see directly. It is in both cases from the same material thing that the light rays come to cause neurological activity, though in the case of the reflection they are said to pursue a devious path. A reflection is, therefore, unlike a shadow; what we perceive, when we see a shadow on the ground, is an unilluminated portion of the ground. Light waves from the object are not reflected off the ground to us as in the case of mirror reflections.

A reflection, we repeat, is not an illusion; there is no illusion of space and objects in it: there is, we are conscious of, actual physical space and material objects in it.⁵ We can get into that space if we come before the mirror; we can get further into it if we walk backwards away from the mirror. If our eyes are confined to seeing only what the mirror shows us, we shall not

⁵ It is interesting to note that Professor J. L. Austin in his lectures at Oxford entitled *Sense and Sensibilia*, stated that if he had to decide whether or not reflections should be called material objects, he would decide that they should be so called.

doubt we touch the objects, taste them, smell and hear them, when we see ourselves do so. We can live without confusion. The confusion occurs when we see objects by means of reflection and at the same time the same or other objects directly. We are then aware of two worlds of space and we tend to call one real and the other an illusion.

Once we do this, however, we spoil our whole achievement and bring into being a whole host of difficulties which have been proved by the history of philosophy to be insurmountable. What, then, are we to do? It is by the following means that I shall try to solve the problem: I shall answer the question *where* the reflections are by saying that they are in the same space and place where the objects themselves are. This may appear a merely logical expedient and something that, at first sight, seems to be paradoxical. It is a conclusion, however, that is dictated by the very nature of the facts. If, when we see reflections, we see the same objects we see directly, it is obvious that the space in which the former are is the very space in which the latter are; for space is wholly and completely to be defined in terms of objects and not independently of them. It is the being of things which gives rise to space, and space is nothing but the objects themselves and the relations that exist between them. If nothing else suggests this definition of space, the facts of reflection alone ought amply to point to it. Happily for us, other optical illusions and, in addition, a large number of problems of physics and cosmology also show the need to re-define our ordinary conceptions of space, which conceptions are by no means necessary but are dependent upon a Newtonian view of the world. This view, with its notion that space is absolute and entirely independent of things, a boundless void, in fact, which is only partially filled by the universe, has permeated our ordinary language: we say, consciously following it, "Objects exist *in space*", or ask, unconsciously influenced by it, "*Where* are the reflections themselves?" Some philosophers, interpreting this question in the light of Newtonian theory, have, using a mirror that is partially transparent, actually plotted out the places where the reflections are!

Where are the reflections themselves? The answer to this question is that the reflections are where the objects are. To ask where a thing is, is to ask only about its position in relation to other things. To ask where a thing is ultimately and absolutely, is an improper question to ask: it is to assume that space is absolute and prior to things, that space has independent being. Things seen in a mirror and seen directly are the same things.

They are the same things seen twice, even if seen together, not two sets of things. Which is the real set and which the unreal? Both are real and they are the *same* set. But where is the set, in front of the mirror or "within it", *here* or *there*? "Here" and "there" are the same, for they both get their being from the things, and the things are the same. Where, for instance, is my shoe? It is *here* (in front of the mirror): that is, between the glass before me and the wall behind, and between the chair on one side of me and the table on the other. It is *there* ("within the mirror"): that is, between the glass and the wall and between the chair and table. It must not be forgotten that the mirror itself, or rather, that part of the glass which can be seen, its frame, for instance, is equally reflected. It appears exactly as though the man in the mirror were also looking into a mirror; and this is certainly what he must do, if he is the same man as the man outside. Where a particular object is, therefore, viewed relatively to other things, is the same when seen directly and when seen in a mirror. It is only this sense of "where" and "space" that is permissible: this is what is suggested by the facts themselves, if we are bold enough to take account of all of them and do not neglect the facts that are difficult to explain; it is the very truth itself if we wish to be consistent.

It is my belief that the illusions of perception are fruitful and, instead of being a stumbling block to philosophy, as they have been in the past, actually lead towards construction and help us to discover what characteristics of material things are essential or necessary to them. Reflections, for instance, have taught us important lessons about space and its nature which help us to solve other problems. To confine ourselves to the problems within perception, the theory that space is relative partly explains the "illusion" suggested by seeing through microscopes and telescopes and all manner of lenses. If one eye is on the instrument and the other looks at objects directly, we again get the illusion of two spaces, and we can again ask the question, which space is the one that is real. As is the case with reflections, both spaces are in fact actually one, space being defined, here as before, in terms of the relations between the objects that give it existence.

There is now the other important difficulty to be considered: it has yet to be explained, if objects and "reflections of them" are the same material things, how it is that we are able to see them twice at the same time, when we see them in front of and "within the mirror". We answer this question thus: the objects between us and the mirror are seen twice because light waves from them activate our retinas at two points, causing two seeings of the same

objects. People tend to forget that we have many eyes or organs of sight, for it is not by means of our eyeballs that we see (they can be replaced by lenses, if lenses can be made as adaptable) but by means of the rods and cones of our retinas: we have not only two eyes but a thousand eyes and we can see, though not equally well, by means of all of them.

The phenomenon of seeing double, when we squint or when we are drunk, another of the so-called illusions of perception, is also explained in a similar way. When we see double, the light rays from one object go to two different receptors or sets of them, and each set of receptors cannot choose but make us see what we do; as far as one eye is concerned, we see by means of the receptors in the centre of its retina, while in the eye that is fixed, by the ball's either being pressed or made rigid by the effect of alcohol, we see with the receptors in the periphery: in the latter case the object is looked at from the corner of the eye.

Professor Ayer⁶ deals with the illusion of double vision in an entirely different way. An analysis of his "explanation" shows the great difference between his treatment of the problem of illusions and the one adopted in this paper. Ayer recommends to the naive realist, who is faced with the illusion of double vision, that he solve his problem by using the following verbal expedient. Since the naive realist is using the word "perceive" in the sense in which to say of an object that it is perceived implies that it exists, he cannot describe the illusion of double vision by saying, "I perceived two pieces of paper but there was really only one piece there". Ayer recommends to the naive realist that he should say instead, "*I thought* I perceived two pieces of paper but I was really perceiving only one".

The queerness of this way of solving the problem becomes clear if we ask what the naive realist's words would be, not in the past tense, in which Ayer has put them, but in the present tense. What should the naive realist, at the moment of having an illusion of double vision, say? He cannot, surely, say, "*I think* I am perceiving two pieces of paper but I am really perceiving only one". We say, "I think I am seeing John approaching me", when there is doubt as to whether the person coming towards me is John or someone else. Or we say, "I think I am seeing", when there is a doubt as to whether we are actually seeing or only imagining. When we have an illusion of double vision, we have no doubt that we are seeing and not imagining and we have no doubt as to what we are seeing. What, then, can the naive realist

⁶ *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, p. 21.

say? He cannot say, "I am perceiving two pieces of paper but I am really perceiving only one", without giving different senses to the word "perceive", which is just what defeats Professor Ayer's method of explanation. He also cannot say, "I am perceiving two pieces of paper but there is really only one", for then he is using the word "perceive" in such a way that it does not entail existence and thus he abandons the naive realist thesis altogether.

Professor Ayer's recommendations to the naive realist cannot satisfy him, for they make him either contradict his position or unconsciously abandon it. If we wish to remain faithful to naive realism, we must always use the word "perceive" in such a way that it implies existence. In double vision, as in normal vision, we perceive and what we perceive in both instances exists. In double vision, therefore, we do not perceive two pieces of paper but we perceive twice one piece of paper. The facts of double vision point to the conclusion, which otherwise might not have been noticed, that the rods and cones in the retina, or groups of them, can and do function separately: they are independent "eyes" or organs of seeing. Here too, as in the case of reflections, the so-called illusions are fruitful and lead us to new knowledge. Reflections threw light on the nature of space, and the facts of double vision yield us information on the nature of seeing, and on what constitutes an organ of sight.

Connected with double vision there is another illusion, that of movement: when, first looking normally, we gradually press in one eyeball, the object we see double seems to leave its place and move away. It actually does not move, if movement is defined in terms of the relation the object has to other objects, for, if we observe closely, we see with the shift of the object an equal shift of the other objects around it: in the case of double vision, if we move our eyes around, we notice that almost everything we see has been doubled, though the phenomenon is prominently noticeable of only one or two objects in the centre of the field of vision. The same relations persist between the object and the others around it and, in accordance with a definition of movement in these terms (*for no absolute motion exists without absolute space*), no movement has occurred. No movement has occurred if by "movement" we refer to a shift in the relations of the seen objects themselves. It might be argued, however, that we do see a movement and that it is this which constitutes the illusion. To this I answer that, when we see the movement, we are not absolutely deceived, for a movement does take place: a shift occurs not in the relations between the objects we see, but

in the relations between them and the eyeball. The eyeball, as we know, has moved, and, though we do not see it (fortunately, because, if we did, its opaqueness would hide everything else), it is as much an object as are the others.

I have little doubt that some of the hallucinations which people experience under the influence of drugs, like the movement of visual objects, can be referred to the actual movement of the eyeballs or the retinal receptors. The same "deception" occurs when we see a station move while passing through it in an express train. No deception, however, has really taken place, for, if movement is defined as a shift or change in the relations between certain objects, this has actually occurred: it is indifferent to the actual fact of movement whether the shift in the relations between the objects is described in terms of the movement of one object or the other.

In the case of seeing reflections also, we are actually seeing double: we are not seeing two things when we see a thing and its reflection in a mirror, but we are seeing one thing twice. In fact, we can see thrice or even four times: if the spherical curvature of our cornea is disturbed by injury, we see more than double. Light rays from one object, through errors of refraction, falling on many places in the retina. The question where the object is, if it is asked here too, is answered in the same way that the question was answered when posed by the problem of mirrors. In double vision, as we remarked earlier, we find that not only one single object is duplicated but the objects around it are also doubled. An object's place, since it is defined in terms of its relations to other objects, is, therefore, the same in both instances of seeing.

Let us now return to reflections and suppose that our hypothetical opponent revives and makes another query. Supposing he asks: "If it is true that, when we see reflections, we see the same objects which are before the mirror, why do we not see them together, why have we to see them as though they were separate?" To this we answer that we cannot see them twice unless we see them distinct and separate: if we do not see them distinct and separate, then, we see them only once, as we do in binocular vision, when we see objects with both eyes but once; seeing distinctly and separately is what constitutes one act of seeing. He may yet ask why, when we see reflections, we see objects which are actually behind us as though they were far in front of us. At least in this we are deceived. Why don't we see them where they actually are, behind us? Why, if this is in truth the case, don't we see behind us as well as in front of us, why aren't we conscious of ourselves in the centre of a spatial realm

with objects before and behind us? To this the reader himself will reply, if he agrees by now with the logic of our answer, that this is, in fact, what we are conscious of: we are conscious, if we look into a mirror and give heed to what we see in it, of ourselves in the middle of a spatial realm with objects before and behind us.

Let us now consider the last problem posed by reflections, which was raised by Professor Prichard and quoted at the beginning of this paper. Why, if the reflections are the same objects that are seen before the mirror, do they *look different*? The reflection presents the appearance which a body similar but reversed as regards right and left would present. How, asks Professor Prichard, if we see a body, can it look otherwise than it is? This question does not refer to the relations between the different parts of the objects seen or its relations to other objects, for it has been clearly shown that the internal spatial relations of the objects seen through the mirror or directly are exactly the same: there is clearly, in the matter of spatial relations, no absolute left and right. The question refers to the *gestalt* or *form* which characterizes the perception: we can sometimes fail to recognize familiar objects when seen in a mirror because of this; a page of print, for example, seen in a mirror can hardly be recognized. We must admit that the objects do look different. This is, however, no argument that when we are seeing reflections we are seeing different things; for, by all the criteria that can be applied, the reflections are real and are the same objects as the things. This phenomenon only proves, as do other gestalt phenomena, that configurations, or combinations of elements into unities of form, occur in seeing, like tunes in hearing. The objects, because they look different, are no more different than things which are turned upside down are different because they present a different appearance to us from how they look right-side up. It is the same with reflections; but, because in reflections it is usual that not one object alone but a whole scene is turned left-side-right, the situation is more akin to that of a man who stands on his head and looks upon the world.

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MODERN PHILOSOPHERS CONSIDER RELIGION

By A. BOYCE GIBSON

It used to be believed that the method of logical analysis in philosophy was incompatible with any kind of religion. There are now many practising logical analysts who are sincerely religious and do not feel the incompatibility. The object of this inquiry, then, is not to discuss *whether* religion and logical analysis are compatible, but *what sort* of religion logical analysis is compatible with. The answer is one which I regret: viz., that if (as I propose to assume for purposes of discussion) religion entails a reference to a God or gods, then the conception of philosophy as logical analysis is compatible only with a religion far removed from the world and indifferent to the requirements of reason.¹

The problem for the analyst who is favourably disposed to religion is that philosophically he starts from a dichotomy between empirical statements, which have no court of appeal but the natural sciences, and analytic statements, in which words (or concepts) are reduced to their simple constituents or extricated from their non-factual entanglements: these being more especially the province of the philosopher. For, on that basis, there can be no significant factual statements about anything other than the one world with which natural science is concerned; and amongst other things, there can be no significant statements about God. This is the predicament from which the logical analyst with religious leanings has to escape. What we are to consider are the intellectual adventures of Christians who have tried.

As a preface to the five adventure stories which follow,² two observations are appropriate. The first is that despite occasional slanted comments which I do not expect to be able to control, the main object in this paper is to consider the terms

¹ To complete the picture, I should have to contend that a religion as unconcerned with intelligence as it would have to be to fulfil the requirements of the logical analysts would be defective as religion: in the first place, because religion as above defined must make at least one assertion about the state of the case, and thus places itself within the orbit of philosophical argument, and secondly because a religion which begins where intelligence leaves off cannot claim, as religion must claim, the whole loyalty of the human creature; and least of all of the creature who is also a philosopher. This is more than can here be attempted.

² R. M. Hare: "Theology and Falsification", in Flew and MacIntyre, *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, pp. 99-103; Thomas McPherson: "Religion as the Inexpressible", *ibid.*, pp. 131-143; R. F. Holland: "Religious Discourse and Theological Discourse", *A. J. P.*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Dec. 1956, pp. 147-163; Bernard Williams: "Tertullian's Paradox", Flew and MacIntyre, pp. 187-211; J. J. C. Smart; "Metaphysics, Logic and Theology", *ibid.*, pp. 12-28, and "The Existence of God", pp. 28-47.

of compatibility between logico-analytic philosophy and the affirmations of the Christian religion.³ Whether these terms are acceptable to those who profess that religion, and whether they are consistent with their philosophical presuppositions, is a question reserved for another paper, though it is too much to hope that the coming event will refrain from casting its shadow before it. The second observation is that no reference is made to John Wisdom's celebrated article, "Gods", or to R. B. Braithwaite's recent Eddington Lecture. It is not that they are irrelevant or unimportant, but partly that one cannot say everything at once, and partly that to speak of God as a point of view, however illuminating, or to advocate a religion consisting entirely of myths, ritual practices and ethical obligations, is to be so far outside the normal system of Western religious assumptions as not to raise the sharper and more specific issues which arise in the case of a religion with an intellectual commitment. None the less, as we shall see, several of our writers edge at times in one or another of these directions, and are held back only by their sense of what Christianity requires.

The first case to be considered, then, is Hare's now famous move about "bliks".⁴ A "blik" is not an assertion; it is a pervasive attitude of mind which underlies assertions. It is a confirmed and habitual way of looking at things. It is *brought to* the facts, not *elicited from* the facts. Therefore it cannot properly be described as true or false. It can, however (and Hare insists on the point), be right or wrong; and he adds, "it is very important to have the right blik". Now religion is just such a blik, and therefore does not enter into the empirical circle of truth and falsehood. But it is emphatically "the right blik". What, then, makes a blik "right"?

The word "right", when contrasted with "true", suggests an affinity with morals rather than with science; and we learn without surprise that the "rightness" of a blik is displayed in action. Suppose, says Hare, a blik to the effect that everything happens by pure chance. This is not an assertion about the world, for it is compatible with anything happening or not happening; but, if held as a belief, it would have the effect of putting an end to planning and prediction; in fact, it would make people *act* differently. So with the belief in God: "by their fruits shall ye know them".

³ The Christian religion is that in which the five adventurers are interested, though their predicament is one which would probably be shared, *mutatis mutandis*, by Jews and Moslems. No attempt is here made to consider the pertinent and far-reaching question how far, if at all, it would be shared by Hinayana Buddhists.

⁴ Flew and MacIntyre: *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, p. 101.

There are here two separate issues which call for discussion. The first is whether a blik can possibly be as detached from the world as Hare supposes. The second is whether Hare himself consistently adheres to this position. The answer in both cases is in the negative.

It is significant that the notion of a blik is introduced to us by an example from the field of obsessional delusion. We are asked to examine the case of a poor lunatic who has a "thing" about dons. He thinks they all want to murder him; and however mild they look and however kindly they talk to him, that is only their diabolical cunning; they are plotting against him, like the rest. Now the peculiarity of these delusions is precisely their imperviousness to the facts. A sane blik is supported by the facts; the lunatic's blik can only be sustained by an increasingly strained and complicated regress of supposition. It is just when a blik is most insane that it fits best into Hare's formula for blik. For the "right" blik *reasons* can be given; not, perhaps, logical demonstrations, but cumulative evidences and perhaps even statistics.⁵ And these reasons are drawn directly or indirectly from the state of the case.

For reasons of philosophical policy, Hare continues to insist that "blik assert nothing"; but what, then, are we to make of their admitted effect on our actions? If a blik, for example, the Christian blik, has power in the world, that in itself, *with reference to the future*, tells us something about the world. The world is such that some blik. concord with the possibility of reasonable action and other blik. do not. But reasonable action cannot be separated from an estimate of states of affairs. Therefore blik. are entangled with states of affairs, at least as anticipated: and only so can they be classified as right and wrong.

One can see the causes of Hare's embarrassment. It would have been more prudent in him as a philosopher to keep his blik. permanently decontaminated from factual references, present or future. But, as a believer, he is naturally convinced that his own blik. is a power for good. So he bisects states of affairs into present and future, observing every antiseptic precaution against the first, and running out, like St. Francis to the leper, to embrace the second. This procedure may be described, according to taste, as a lapse from the decencies of modern philosophy, or a good recovery from a bad start. In any case, his Christian faith has restored to him, almost by subterfuge, what, but for his philosophical preconceptions, need never have been taken away from him. His attempt to effect an alliance between his faith and his

⁵ The year-book will tell us how many murders dons *do* commit.

philosophy must be called a failure, because his faith leads him into courses which his philosophy cannot countenance. There is no immovable barrier between present and future, and as regards the future, at least, bliks are evaluated by reference to states of affairs.

Hare's mission of reconciliation breaks down because to succeed he both must and must not maintain a radical disconnexion between religion and the facts. This paradox, as we shall see, infects all reconciliations which, like Hare's, honestly take account of what modern philosophy and any Western religion respectively require. But a devout mind with modern philosophical preconceptions may be tempted to save religion by moving God firmly out of this world, where He can be safely adored without damage to the preconceptions. As Hare and Williams and Smart have all of them seen, this move is a particularly difficult one for Christians, because it cuts right across the doctrine of Incarnation; but it can claim some support, even among Christians, from the entirely orthodox doctrine of God's incomprehensibility. It is along these lines that McPherson proceeds in his essay "Religion as the Inexpressible".⁶ This essay is indeed a particularly interesting contribution to our panorama, because it argues not merely that "positivism" (as he brashly calls the modern way of philosophizing) is *compatible* with religion, but further, that it can be of great assistance to religion, by ridding it of prejudicial complications. "By showing, in their own way, the absurdity of what theologians try to utter, positivists have helped to suggest that religion belongs to the sphere of the unutterable."⁷

In support of this contention, McPherson appeals to Rudolf Otto's analysis of religion, which places the non-rational element ("the numinous") at the heart of religion, and relegates its intellectual statement to the fringes. Once conceptualized, "the numinous" is numinous no longer.⁸ Having thus established a contact to which many Christian believers will be sympathetic, if not committed, he then asks us to consider Otto's affinities with the Wittgenstein of the last sentences of the *Tractatus*. "Not *how* the world is, is the mystical, but *that* it is."⁹ Here we are faced with a question which cannot be answered: and to know that it cannot be answered relieves us of the worry of thinking it can be answered when it has not been answered, and of a sense of religious inadequacy in being discontented with the current

⁶ Flew and MacIntyre, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-143.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁸ Cf. in a religious tradition very different from that of German Protestantism, the Tao-Te-Ching, V. 1. "The Tao that can be expressed is not the eternal Tao."

⁹ *Tractatus*, 6: 44.

attempts at answers. Thus the unmasking of theology may be the liberation of religion. Whether Wittgenstein himself should be treated as a mystic in the style of Johannes Scotus Erigena ("God, on account of his excellence, might not inappropriately be called Nothing"), or whether, as McPherson suggests, the "vanishing of the problem" is not so much an illumination, ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, as the lifting of a neurosis, is a matter for the exegesis of disciples.¹⁰ But whatever Wittgenstein's intention, there is nothing in the text to impede the believer who should descend from his cloud-capped watershed on the side of religion: not, of course, expressed religion, or theology (about which McPherson speaks uncharitably till his very last sentence), but the religion of the inexpressible, whose object is too high and mysterious even to speak of.

In committing himself to this unusual alignment, McPherson at least succeeds where Hare, too greatly concerned about Christian action, failed: he produces an accommodation which in no way trespasses against the axioms of the analytic philosophy. But he does it by interpreting the expression of religion as a betrayal of religion. Religion is "unsayable", and religious statements (which are what make the trouble for the logical analyst), are not even religious. On this it must be said (i) that it means two things at once, and (ii) that McPherson himself, towards the end of his essay, has some highly subversive second thoughts.

(i) One of the most curious tricks of recent anti-rationalists in religion is their "slide" from the thesis, "religion does not consist of making statements" to the quite different thesis, "religion has nothing to do with making statements". The first thesis a believer would accept; the second he could only accept through misunderstanding; and to argue from the first to the second is to perpetrate a fallacy. Otto, whom McPherson has cited for the prosecution, may here usefully be cross-examined for the defence. He is known for his insistence that religion is *sui generis* and is not reducible to its cognitive activities. But he also spends some time showing how the mysterious and inexpressible can be conceptually "schematized", and, far from considering this to be a demeaning of religion, holds it to be an enrichment of religion.¹¹ Religion is inexpressible: but some expressions of it are more successful than others. Words like "absolute" and "eternal" are

¹⁰ F. P. Ramsey evidently feared the mystical streak in Wittgenstein when he observed: "What we can't say, we can't say, and we can't whistle it either."

¹¹ Cf. *The Idea of the Holy*, English Trans., p. 47, "the intimate *interpenetration* of the non-rational with the rational elements of the religious consciousness, like the interweaving of warp and woof in a fabric"; and p. 113, "if disregard of the numinous elements tends to impoverish religion, it is no less true that 'holiness', 'sanctity', as Christianity intends the words, *cannot dispense with the rational*", (italics mine throughout). In these passages McPherson's witness surely lets him down.

only approximative, but they schematize the object of religion less inadequately than "relative" and "evanescent". It at least makes sense to say of the propositions of theology that they are more or less suited to the experiences of the numinous which they set themselves to translate. And theology apart, there is religious testimony, through which the witness directs his hearers to the inexpressible itself. If we strictly enforce McPherson's recommendation, "we ought not to try to express the inexpressible", no believer ought ever to talk to another believer about God: which, in a religious organization, is clearly absurd. If that is the kind of assistance which analytic philosophy can render to religion, there will soon be no religion left. Religion demands witness and communication: "I will *tell* what great things the Lord hath done for me." In fact, what is "unsayable" is also not worth saying.

(ii) It is perhaps for these reasons that McPherson does not end with the assurance of his early pages. In the first place he expresses concern lest "'first order' religious statements" (for example, presumably, the statements of testifiers) should be thrown away with theology (p. 142); and in the second, he denies that he wishes "theology" to be "adapted to positivistic requirements": "theology does not gain by being reduced to the terms of any school of philosophy" (p. 143). Agreed; but why this concern for an activity which he has earlier proposed not merely to adapt, but to clamp down on—in accordance with positivistic requirements? It is to be suspected that McPherson, as a believer, is becoming alarmed at the consequences of his Egyptian alliance. To conciliate the philosophers, he has wholly disconnected philosophy from worship: which is a sad condition for one who is both a worshipper and a philosopher. He has made it logically impossible that his right hand should know what his left hand is doing. The Otto-Wittgenstein cocktail has evidently gone to his head.

R. F. Holland's thesis in this *Journal* is a stronger and more sophisticated version of McPherson's. It is an improvement in that it draws the line, not between religion and discourse, but between religious discourse and theological discourse: and it is far more aware of (though equally ready to embrace) the formidable consequences of its main assertion. But it is similar in that it insists that theology (that is, statements about God) has nothing to do with religion, and is the result of what it is now fashionable to describe as a confusion of categories (cf. especially page 149). An analysis of its main drift will further clarify the difficulties inherent in accommodations between religion and the new way of ideas.

Holland begins with the same unexceptionable observations as McPherson; religion is one thing and theology another, and being a theologian is not essential to the life of religion (p. 147). But, as with McPherson, these platitudes are rendered dynamic by a slide from "different" to "alternative" and from "non-essential" to "source of confusion". That philosophical pre-conceptions play their part in these *non-sequiturs* is clear from a passage at the top of page 149, where Holland argues: Metaphysics is a product of confusion: theology is a species of metaphysics; therefore theology is the product of confusion. Religion, we are warned from the start, is to be saved by being separated from theology, that is, metaphysics, that is, intelligent examination. But Holland's superior dialectical quality comes out in his many ingenious devices for commending this procedure to the religious consciousness.

In the first place, he knows that the believer *does* make statements about God, as well as invoking Him in prayer or adoration; what he calls the "high-level generalizations of religious experience", such as that "God is his Creator", or that "God is the God of mercy, of Whose forgiveness he stands in need". But of these he says that they are not so much about God as about the believer, or, perhaps, about the believer's relationship to God. The correction shows that he is caught in two minds. His first thought entails that God is nothing but a strange event in the believer's experience. His second thought recovers God from the experience of Him and merely insists that we can only know Him through the experience He produces. No believer will accept the first. The second is both true and at least as orthodox as Descartes, but except when aided by an *arrière-pensée* from the first it does not carry Holland's conclusion. Statements about the wrath and the mercy of God *are* statements about God, even if, or even because, they are also statements about His relation to us; just as statements about Florence Nightingale's anger with the War Office and compassion for common soldiers are statements about Florence Nightingale. Surely we have outgrown the period of philosophy when to be related was somehow not to be. Or have we?

In the second place, in a long discussion of passages from Papini, C. S. Lewis, and C. A. Coulson, Holland attracts the believer's sympathy by criticizing intellectualist and aesthetic deviations in religion. "There are many possible objects of study and aesthetic enjoyment, and God is not one of them" (p. 155). To approach God as a particularly important fact, or as one would approach a particularly valuable painting, would indeed be to miss the point of religion. But Holland, once more,

takes an "either-or" view of religion and the world, and concludes from these reasonable premisses, most unreasonably, that to think about God (and presumably to be artistic in His honour, like the *jongleurs de Dieu*) is being unreligious. But a religion so exclusive cannot be what believers insist that it is: the mainspring of our lives and the light of the world. The moral surely is that Holland's "either-or" is simply a mistake, due to the combined pressure of a religion which has no commerce with intelligence and an intelligence which has no commerce with religion.

Thirdly, Holland understands that the believer is going to raise the problem of existence which that pressure is determined to silence. "'God exists' means more than 'I believe in God'", is the objection he puts to himself. But, he inquires, if a man does not believe in God, in what respect does the believer hold him mistaken? Not, he replies, in thinking a being not to exist who actually does exist. For if that were so "it would be possible for a person to become religious simply by being presented with an item of information", and knowledge would render faith superfluous. Once again, Holland advances from acceptable premisses to an impossible conclusion. He is right in thinking that theistic conviction without personal involvement cannot produce a believer: that is to say, theistic conviction is not sufficient. But the same would hold of personal involvement without theistic conviction. Personal involvement is required under Communism, which, incidentally, has its dogmas, its hierarchy, its confessional, its repentance, its sense of salvation, its *ecclesia*, and all the traditional problems of balance between the Church (the Party) and the secular arm (diplomacy, industry and the army). The difference between the Communist involvement and the Christian involvement does not lie in the involvement, which is common to both, but in what there is involvement *with*. If there is "not even the possibility of a 'cognitive encounter' with the object of faith" (p. 161), the object of faith might presumably be anything at all, and to have faith is not to know even in principle what it is that one has faith in. The conclusion to be drawn from this *reductio ad absurdum* is that some "cognitive content" for the religious involvement, if not sufficient, is at least necessary.

Perhaps, however, we have done Holland an injustice. It is unlikely that he would fail to distinguish between, for example, God and a Communist society; a Communist society could be recognized by certain empirical marks. But that is just the trouble. So would God, *if He existed*. The fact that there are no empirical tests for God suggests that existence is not to be ascribed to Him. This has been said before, for example by

Flew in the discussion on "Theology and Falsification",¹² and Flew draws the natural atheistic conclusion. But Holland appears to think that God is somehow honoured by the denial of His existence. In the first place, the infinity ascribed to God when we speak of His "*infinite* goodness and mercy" cannot be predicated of any existent. In the second place (once again, Holland knows how to wheedle the believer) to worship anything that exists is idolatry, and that goes for God as well as for classless societies and for golden calves. It is, then, religiously as well as philosophically important that God should not exist. Get rid of this metaphysical preoccupation, and religion and philosophy will cease to quarrel.

As our business at present is not so much to correct our adventurers as to observe them, and as Holland has convincingly shown what kind of religion it is that his kind of philosophy is at home with, we should doubtless hold back the awkward questions which keep pressing forward. But one would like to know what he finds on the other side of being. It must be something (to use Findlay's phrase)¹³ which it is "unworthy to identify with anything existing", but this something is not, as for Findlay, "certain ideals". We gather that it is to be called God, that it is absolutely infinite, that it can have no predicates in common with existing things. It is an open question whether the emotional overtones are neo-Platonic or Barthian. If the former, it is a shame that the Emperor Julian died before the arrival of his reinforcements. If the latter, it is tempting to observe that to attach oneself, in 1956, to German theology and British philosophy is to make the worst of both worlds.

Bernard Williams differs (I venture to think for the better) from McPherson and Holland in clinging to the paradoxes of religion, instead of volatilizing the existential reference in order to avert them. Like his contemporaries, he finds religious utterance puzzling; but he takes it as he finds it, and then bids us contemplate the consequences. Instead of exalting religion by separating it from the world, he notes its necessary relation to the world and therefore finds it difficult.

The point from which Williams sets out is the addiction to paradox which is characteristic of so much religious utterance; and he takes as an instance the famous paradox of Tertullian, concerning the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ: "*certum est, quia impossibile*". It could be contended that paradox in Tertullian was a trick carried over by a converted barrister from

¹² Flew and MacIntyre, pp. 96-99.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

his secular pleadings; but Williams takes it seriously as "an essential part of what is being said".¹⁴ What he means becomes clear from his long discussion of religious language, in which he convincingly shows how religious statement and statements about the world accompany and determine one another. This is true in the history of natural theology; for example, the moment people cease to believe that the failure of crops is due to God's direct intervention, statements about nature and statements about God change concurrently and must so change (p. 201). But it is more than ever true in Christian theology. "If all talk about God were only about God, and all talk about the world only about the world, how could it be that God was the God of the Christian believer, who is a toiler in the world of men?" (p. 202). But, in that case, there must be paradox, "because, although we must have some statement which says something about both God and the world, when we have it we find we have something we cannot properly say". We have to "lay bare the points of intersection"; and these "must contain something incomprehensible" (p. 207).

So far there is nothing which the most orthodox believer would disclaim. He knows that the Incarnation is a mystery, not to be unravelled by the methods of geometry or the natural sciences, and he certainly does not claim that in this life the ways of God are open to human discernment. But he insists, whatever the explanation, whether there is an explanation or not, that the separateness of God and the world has ended. That is to say, he holds onto the fact, and therefore disowns the separatist dogma. That, as a fact about the believer, Williams does not deny. But he goes on to say that what the believer asserts is unintelligible, and he calls Tertullian, who glories in the unintelligibility, as a principal witness. He notes, however, that Tertullian died a heretic; and it does not surprise him, for a man who embraces the incomprehensible has no notion what he will beget, except that the progeny will be his. Certainly he would not know what it was for his beliefs to be true. And on that basis, the difference between believer and non-believer, and between orthodox and heretic, insensibly vanishes: and Williams himself leaves us doubtful whether he is an unusually understanding sceptic or a believer engaging without prejudice in subversive acrobatics. Perhaps he is preparing a sermon in reply to St. Paul's, in defence of the unknown God.

There is no doubt that Williams, unlike McPherson and Holland, understands the believer's demands; he knows that he

¹⁴ Flew and MacIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

will not acknowledge "bliks", dichotomies, or a "wholly other" beyond Being. He does religion the justice of letting it speak for itself, instead of insisting on its being what Isis and Cam can allow it to be. Alas, he pays for his sympathy and clear-sightedness by a personal perplexity. They accept religion on their own terms. He is baffled by religion on religion's terms. Just because he understands religion better, he finds it harder to defend. But his presuppositions are theirs over again. From the premiss that God and the world never meet (or, in the modern idiom, that there must be no intersection between religious and non-religious languages), they conclude that God (or religious language) must be kept unspotted from the world, while he concludes that, this being religiously impossible, religious belief (not only theology) is intrinsically unintelligible. But the premiss still stands, and one is tempted, in view of its grave inconvenience, to ask why. The answer can only be that to admit the meeting of God and the world (or the intersection of languages) is to challenge the accepted dogma that there is nothing in the world but finite events known by the methods of empirical science. Once again, it has been shown that the only kind of religion reconcilable with modern philosophy is one that leaves the world severely alone.

Even so, the procedure of Williams' final pages is far too summary. From saying that there is "*something* incomprehensible" about the "points of intersection", something that the believer "does not *properly* understand",¹⁵ he passes to the unwarranted conclusion that at the points of intersection *no* statement is truer than any other. It would follow only if for "something incomprehensible" he had written "nothing comprehensible", and for "does not properly understand", "does not understand at all". Williams wrote as he did, correctly, because he was aware of the blend in religion of mystery and illumination. He concluded as he did, incorrectly, because the reservations concealed in "something" and "properly" would permit of ideological deviation. Actually, the paradoxes of religious language spring precisely from there being "something *incomprehensible*" which is not "properly understood", which is nevertheless *apprehensible*, and, in a flash of history, significantly declared. They express not ignorance paraded as knowledge, but partial knowledge straining to pass beyond its frontiers. The tantalizing glimpses it gives of the undiscovered hinterland show that it is not in vain. But to admit it would be to admit, in the world, something the world had presciently excluded because it violated

¹⁵ Italics mine.

the intellectual decencies of a secular society. *Certum est, quia impossibile* is a challenge to the secular notion of impossibility: it is a flamboyant way of telling the decencies to mind their business.

We come, finally, to Professor Smart.

The understanding of the believer's position shown by Williams is also shown by Smart, but with this difference: that whereas Williams, in its presence, is harassed by his philosophical conscience, Smart thinks that the believer's position is quite undisturbed by the recent trend of British philosophy. In this he agrees with McPherson; but whereas McPherson, to be secure, thinks it necessary to hoist religion into the region of the inexpressible, Smart, like Williams, takes religion as it stands, and still finds no contradiction. Now if he is right, the main drift of this article must be mistaken. He is therefore the most crucial exhibit of them all.¹⁰

Smart begins by expounding, as to one brought up on A E I and O, the conception of logic as universal analysis, a principal function of which is to take hold of "metaphysical" questions, having the appearance of "being about the world", and either dissolving them, so that there is no question at all, or "transforming" them into factual questions. This is an old story, but Smart injects new interest into it from the beginning by mentioning as among the residuary legatees of metaphysics, not merely the natural sciences, but also "practical ethics" and "revealed theology" (p. 16). There are some metaphysical questions which, when logically sifted, are theological questions. The line, therefore, is to be drawn, not between the world and religion, and not between religion and theology, but between theology and metaphysics. But theology proceeds by statement and argument. It must therefore be a sort of empirical science, the subject of which is the religious life of a given religious community. And this, it is said, the procedures of logical analysis admit and even encourage, once they are purged of "metaphysics".

An example may be taken from the controversy between Athanasius and the Arians. The Arians, in this struggle, had most of the highbrows on their side. "Made, not begotten", would have fitted better with the Greek metaphysical tradition from Plato's *Laws* downwards. Now to worship anything which was made was in the Christian community idolatry. But that same

¹⁰ Smart's contributions to the subject figure as Chapters II and III of the Flew-MacIntyre collection. The first is a dialogue concerning the usefulness of logic for students of theology. The second is for the most part a destructive analysis of the traditional demonstrative proofs of the existence of God. Neither is directed to the issue before us. His attitude towards it, however, comes out both in his assumptions and in his digressions, which are most illuminating.

community was constrained by its reading of the Gospels to acknowledge Christ as an object of worship. Therefore the proper rendering of Christian conviction was "begotten, *not* made". It was because he refused to budge from this conviction that Athanasius would have no truck with the Arians, and his victory was a victory of the pew over the pundits, of religion (or theology) over metaphysics. As Smart observes, though encumbered with Greek metaphysical language, "he was trying to do justice to the question of what is a proper object of worship" (p. 20); and this kind of inquiry, presumably, is what Smart means by "theology".¹⁷

Thus presented, the thesis will undoubtedly attract the fashionable theologians who think that if they replace Greek preconceptions with Hebrew preconceptions, they will have a Biblical theology without any preconceptions at all. These prophetic oversimplifiers do not interest Smart; if he encourages them, it is, I am sure, unknowingly and unwillingly. But he shares one of their passions, namely, their animus against "natural theology", and not merely because of its claim to complete demonstration, but also because it claims to hold irrespective of religious commitment. "We believe in the necessity of God's existence because we are Christians; we are not Christians because we believe in the necessity of God's existence" (p. 40). And, still more radically, "The word 'God' gets its meaning from the part it plays in religious speech and literature, and in religious speech and literature the question of existence does not arise" (p. 41). All our talk about God is inside the circle of the converted; for the converted it is full of meaning; for the others, who do not move in the language-circles in which the word 'God' is current, it is naturally both mystifying and exasperating. But the converted do not talk about God's existence; it is no problem for them. And so "it is possible to hold that the question 'Does God exist?' is not a proper question without necessarily also holding that religion and theology are nonsensical" (p. 41).

I propose, firstly, to contend that this will not do; and secondly, to pay tribute to the profound and moving inconsistencies introduced into the discussion by Smart himself.

We may grant to Smart, as to his predecessors, that no amount of metaphysics is a substitute for religion; for myself I grant further his account of theology as an attempt "to do justice to the question of what is a proper object of worship", in the tradition of a given community; and we may admit (some

¹⁷ Cf. his observation, p. 28: "nowhere in the Old or New Testaments do we find any evidence of people's religion having a metaphysical basis."

of us) that our belief in God is channelled through a special revelation.¹⁸ But these considerations do not even allow, let alone entail, the reduction of metaphysics to logic-cum-theology: as the following analysis will show.

Let us assume that theology is the systematizing of what a religious community believes; and let us proceed as above, to disclaim all concern with existence. In that case theology *could* be the systematization of what is believed falsely. Now it is true that the believer does not normally raise the question of God's existence; he may even regard it as "not a proper question"; but that is not because he is indifferent to it, but because he takes it for granted. Once his attention is drawn to it, he is extremely concerned to defend it; he will not have it that he is worshipping nothing: and, it has to be insisted, what does not exist *is* nothing. Thus from inside his circle of faith, he has to raise the question which it is claimed faith can dispense with: and insofar as Smart purports to describe the mind of the believer, he is certainly in error. The point he neglects is that to reflect on one's belief is not to stop believing. It is the philosopher, and a minority variant of the species at that, who lets down this iron curtain between belief and existence. But, as a matter of ordinary analysis, it is most unplausible to reduce a statement such as "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us" into a non-existential statement describing the beliefs of the Church. "To believe", as applied to a statement, means "to believe to be the case"; if the Church believes that the Word was made flesh, as it does, it is not making a statement about its believing, it is making a statement about the world. It may be right and it may be wrong; but at least it is not merely contemplating its own contemplations.

It would be unjust to Smart to fasten exclusively on this side of his thinking. In the first place, he writes of "metaphysical questions (which) turn out to be *also theological*":¹⁹ the main example being "Why should there be anything at all?" It could be, no doubt, that such a question can only be answered when its confusions have been removed, and then in terms of theology or the special sciences. But (and this is Smart's second reservation), when it comes to the point, he shows his hesitation by trimming his words. Of questions like "have we free-will?", he writes "even though their questions turn out to be conceptual in nature, or *at any rate* to be *very largely* conceptual in nature" (pp. 22-23); and again, "conceptual investigations *help* to clarify

¹⁸ I Peter i.21: "who *through him* do believe in God, who raised him up from the dead, and gave him glory" (and otherwise, perhaps not).

¹⁹ P. 17. Cf., p. 19, "*not only* a metaphysical question, but *also* a theological one". (Italics mine in all these quotations.)

metaphysical disputes" (p. 23); which, by the way, no one would dream of denying. Thirdly, he goes on being impressed by the question, "Why should anything exist at all?", even though "logic has taught (him) to look at such a question with the deepest suspicion" (p. 46). To develop these points would take us too far afield: we can only remark briefly that there is a strong metaphysical impetus in Smart which persists, like Galileo, in muttering things under its breath, as he submits himself, all too willingly, to the philosophical inquisitors of his time. If his incidental uneasinesses are ever allowed free play, they may lead to a more careful consideration of the role of logical analysis in a metaphysical inquiry which is not *just* logical analysis than any that has been attempted since the days of Bradley and Bosanquet. Nothing, at our present stage of development, could be more rewarding.

It remains true, however, that with the more conscious part of his mind Smart is concerned with philosophy as a logical instrument for deleting metaphysical items from the agenda; though he is original in that he proposes to re-present their substance under the heading of theology. As this device entails that theology shall not concern itself with existential issues, we have found it unsatisfactory. Theology can remain in this condition only in so far as it fails to make the distinction between believing and what is believed, between the collective experience to be interpreted and the object which alone holds that experience together. This is more than any theologian can swallow; and, once again, the cause of the trouble lies in philosophical preconceptions. The metaphysical reference to existence has to be eliminated because otherwise there would be something in the world beyond the range of the natural sciences. This is the main single factor which is driving so many Christian believers into a deplorable irrationalism; and the ingenious inclusion of theology with the natural sciences breaks down because a theology which systematizes beliefs about God must do what, by its terms of reference, it cannot do: say something about God: just as any self-respecting aesthetic must say something not merely about critics' opinions, but about art.

We have examined five different attempts by believers or near-believers to review their beliefs against a background of contemporary British philosophy. We have concluded that the type of religion which is compatible with modern philosophy is one which is detached from the world and unresponsive to intelligence. It has not been possible, in the course of the inquiry, to conceal a conviction that, as religion, this type of religion will not do; and in that case, any type of religion which will do is

likely to conflict with the assumptions of recent philosophy. Once these are granted, it seems to me, atheists like Flew and Ayer have much the best of the argument. Those who wish to dissent from their conclusions are committed to disputing their premisses.

Naturally, five swallows do not make a summer. But it is most unlikely that others will succeed where our adventurers have failed. For the failure is due neither to lack of piety nor to lack of ingenuity, but to the nature of the attempt. It just cannot be true both that no statements can be about God and that there must be at least one statement about God. But one thing they have shown convincingly. Only an irrationalist religion can fit their philosophical requirements. Some preliminary reasons have here been given why such a religion cannot satisfy the religious consciousness. The issue should be further debated, but only in another article.

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THE CLAIMS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

By H. J. N. HORSBURGH

At one time the believer could rest securely on religious experience. The sceptics might nibble at the doctrinal frills of his religion; but they could not touch his seamless inner garment of truth, which was freshly woven in every generation by the experience of the Church's saints, and, to a lesser extent, even by the experience of the most vacillating and sinful Christian. But in our own century the sceptics have tried to set their teeth in this seamless garment. Psychologists have carried out what are commonly thought of as damaging researches into the nature of religious experience, and more recently philosophers have joined them in making difficulties for the believer—and not only the neanderthalers of the linguistic age in philosophy (the early logical positivists), but also *Homo sapiens* at his highest power, as represented by the followers of the later Wittgenstein. It is with this recent philosophical onslaught that I am concerned in this article.

An attempt to estimate its force should be prefaced by a close study of what has actually been claimed for religious experience—particularly by the mystics, since it is with them that I am primarily concerned. But such an investigation is clearly impossible, as even the classics of Western mysticism form a literature of very considerable bulk. I shall therefore confine myself to the examination of some of the claims that might be made. These claims will be considered as they are suggested by the objections themselves.

My paper, then, has two aims: (*a*) to give a brief account of the main objections which have recently been brought against religious experience as either a source of, or as a means of confirming, religious beliefs; and (*b*) to consider what important claims they dispose of (if any). The first of these aims is rendered difficult by the fact that as the attack comes from a single school of philosophy the objections tend to run into one another. The three parts into which I divide it are therefore somewhat artificial. I shall call these (1) the psychological objection, (2) the verificationist objection, and (3) the objection from the ineffable nature of religious experience. These labels are mere conveniences: I claim no special aptness for them.

I

The psychological objection is the most popular at the present time. One can therefore find many accounts of it. I shall quote from three writers who have recently put it forward. "... I want to argue", says Mr. Alasdair MacIntyre, "that neither feeling-states nor mental images could provide evidence for religious belief The reason for this is that the point of the experience is allegedly that it conveys information about something other than the experience, namely, about the ways of God. Now an experience of a distinctively "mental" kind, a feeling-state or an image cannot of itself yield us any information about anything other than the experience."¹ A much more elaborate account of the same objection is to be found in Mr. C. B. Martin's article, "A Religious Way of Knowing".² But at one place it is succinctly stated: "The only thing that I can establish beyond correction on the basis of having certain feelings and sensations is that I have these feelings and sensations".³ Finally, an account of essentially the same objection is to be found in Professor R. B. Braithwaite's Arthur Eddington Memorial Lecture.⁴ "If it is maintained", says Braithwaite, "that the *existence* of God is known by observation in the 'self-authenticating' experience of 'meeting God', the term 'God' is being used merely as part of the description of that particular experience." At first sight this seems to be quite a different argument. But this impression is mistaken; for what Braithwaite is saying is that the term "God" can only be used, in such contexts, as part of one's description of a particular experience, for one is only referring to one's own feelings, images, etc., and these cannot be used to establish an existential claim.

In the above I have given pride of place to MacIntyre's statement of the objection because it reveals the nature of the argument most clearly. It is also the purest form of the argument, since both the other versions contain intrusive references to other issues. (I shall have something to say about these issues later without referring back explicitly to the passages I have quoted.)

I think it must be agreed that if mystical experiences consist merely of unusual feelings or peculiar sensations or images, i.e., if they are experiences of "a distinctively 'mental' kind" in MacIntyre's sense, they do not establish the existence of God or

¹ *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, pp. 255-256.

² *Mind*, 1952; reprinted in *New Essays*, pp. 76-95.

³ *New Essays*, p. 79.

⁴ *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief*, p. 4.

support any belief concerning His nature. Indeed, no massive apparatus of logic is needed to appreciate this point; it might be expected to lie within the range of even a mystic's mundane intelligence. But to say that mystical experiences are any of these things is to beg the most vital question at issue, namely, the nature of mystical experience. Admittedly, mystics do frequently use the words "feeling", "image", and "sensation" in connexion with their experiences. But linguistic philosophers are aware that the logical topography of these terms is most involved and should therefore be the first to appreciate that mystics may sometimes use them in different senses from those illustrated by such sentences as "I have a prickly sensation", "I am haunted by the image of Britannia", or "I have a numb feeling in my toe". In fact, it is obvious that more is claimed by mystics for their experiences than is allowed by those who urge the psychological objection; they would refuse to agree that their visions are visionary in the same sense as the dagger of Macbeth, or that their moments of ecstasy or illumination are ecstatic or illuminating in the same senses as the experience of a gardener confronted by a perfect rose or of a logician suddenly conscious of an interesting distinction. And their claim to have experienced something other than bizarre or beguiling feelings is borne out by the fact that their conduct in no way resembles the conduct of those who have devoted their lives to the cultivation of such feelings.

Braithwaite and MacIntyre do not even dismiss these claims; they ignore them. And Martin summarises the psychological objection in the sentence I have quoted before he has examined them. However, he later attempts to show that the logic of such statements as "I have direct experience of God and therefore know He exists" is "very, very like" the logic of such admittedly psychological statements as "I have a queer feeling and therefore know I have a queer feeling". I shall contend that Martin is wrong in this logical assertion. But at the moment I wish to make a different point, namely that even if these statements have a similar logic one can only rule out the existential claim with assurance by falling back (as all the writers quoted do, at least implicitly) on cast-iron assertions as to the possibilities of experience. Thus Martin says:⁵ "Because 'having direct experience of God' does not admit the relevance of a society of tests and checking procedures it places itself in the company of the other ways of knowing which preserve their self-sufficiency, 'uniqueness', and 'incommunicability' by making a psychological

⁵ *New Essays*, p. 85.

and not an existential claim". In brief, the existential claim must be withdrawn. But it is quite conceivable that the world should be such that only some people can (in the empirical sense) discover certain things about it. For all that Braithwaite, MacIntyre and Martin know to the contrary this may describe the actual situation of the mystics. In other words, the existential claim can only be ruled out by applying logical distinctions (e.g., those between thoughts, feelings, sensations, images, etc.) that have arisen out of ordinary experience. But mystical experience is not ordinary experience; and therefore, it remains an open question whether the distinctions that we ordinarily make would require either to be modified or changed altogether if account were to be taken of it. There seems to be something scholastic in its rigidity about this whole mode of argument. One can imagine, for example, the plight of a present-day scientist pitch-forked without books or apparatus into the middle ages and forced to engage in discussion with philosophers who applied 20th century techniques to the elucidation of 13th century speech. At every turn he would be accused of unwarrantably extending the meanings of words, using misleading analogies, falling into mislocations and distortions of logical geography, etc., etc. What could he do if these philosophers stood on their logic and refused to enlarge their experience in the way that he might suggest?⁶

But in any case it is quite wrong to speak of the logic of statements concerning religious experience as "very, very like" the logic of psychological statements. There are several important differences. But, at the moment, so as not to trespass on the ground of the next section, I shall mention only one. This difference arises out of the fact that, whereas psychological statements are always made with the same assurance, claims based on religious experience are made with varying degrees of assurance. Thus, it does not make sense to ask: "Is A less sure he has the sensation x than B is sure he has the sensation y?" On the other hand it makes perfectly good sense to ask: "Which of them is the more sure that he has had direct experience of God, A or B?"

To point out further differences would be to pass on to the verificationist objection. Indeed, the psychological objection is to be regarded as a special or disguised form of the verificationist

⁶ The cult of failing to understand one's opponents has reached such proportions in some quarters that it gives rise to curious flickers of apprehension. Thus, I have never heard a philosopher complain that he cannot understand those stories of Edgar Allan Poe's in which the spirit of someone dead returns to inhabit or share the body of someone living. Yet in discussions of immortality many philosophers fail to understand similar notions. One can only grieve when the hallmark of philosophical acumen becomes an incapacity to understand.

objection, in that, if subjected to sufficient scrutiny, it turns into that objection. Thus, when someone claims to have intuitive or clairvoyant powers and refuses to admit that his "hunches" are mere feelings, images, etc., we test his claims, and the retention or withdrawal of the word "mere" turns on the results of these tests. In advancing the psychological objection, therefore, one is maintaining either that such tests have been applied to the mystic and his claims shown to be unfounded or that (as Martin suggests) no tests can be applied to him and therefore his claims *must* be unfounded.

II

Martin raises the verificationist objection in as telling a way as any when he asks: "How do we know that someone has had direct experience of God or that we ourselves have had such an experience?" In other cases in which existential claims are made "a whole society of tests and checking up procedures are available"; in this case, according to Martin, it does not exist. He sharpens the objection by drawing attention to two interesting possibilities. The first of these is the possibility of a full description of an alleged direct experience of God. He writes:⁷ ". . . the theologian discourages⁸ any detailed description of the required experience ('apprehension of God'). The more naturalistic and detailed the description of the required experience became, the easier would it become to deny the existential claim. One could say, 'Yes, I had those very experiences, but they certainly did not convince me of God's existence'. The only sure defence here would be for the theologian to make the claim analytic — 'You *couldn't* have those experiences and at the same time sincerely deny God's existence'." The second possibility is that those who used to make the existential claim should cease to do so, while maintaining that their experiences have not changed. "Perhaps they still attend church services and pray as often as they used to do, and perhaps they claim to have the same sort of experiences as they had when they were believers, but they refuse to accept the conclusion that God exists."⁹

I want to begin what I have to say by way of comment on this objection with some remarks on the subject of self-authentication, the topic raised by the question "How do I know that I have had direct experience of God?"

⁷ *New Essays*, p. 80.

⁸ Martin produces no evidence whatsoever to justify the use of the word "discourage". This would seem a peculiarly disingenuous attack, coming from one who would probably also wish to urge the objection from the ineffable nature of mystical experience.

⁹ *New Essays*, p. 87.

Martin and Braithwaite pay no heed to the most remarkable feature of self-authentication in religious experience, namely, that it is not self-authenticating in the same way as it has sometimes been claimed that moral intuitions are self-authenticating. Thus, if asked "Why is murder wrong?", the ethical intuitionist would reply "One just *knows* that it is". This is not a slowly dawning moral perception; it is something that strikes one as soon as one thinks about it. But mystical experience does not seem to be self-authenticating in its beginnings; or, at any rate, not so self-authenticating as to be destructive of doubt. Many religious people can set themselves the question, "Have I had direct experience of God?" and be forced to answer either "I don't know" or "I think so, but I'm not sure". Only the experiences of the greatest mystics would seem to be fully self-authenticating. As I have already shown, this growth of self-authentication serves to distinguish the logic of statements about mystical experience from the logic of ordinary experiential statements. It is also important in connexion with the testing of the mystic's claims, as I hope to show.

Nobody who emphasises the importance of religious experience would wish to deny that this self-authentication is mysterious; indeed, for different reasons from those of the sceptic he would wish to stress its mystery. Nevertheless, something can be said to dispose us more favourably towards it. For example, it can be pointed out, many everyday assertions are mysterious in a somewhat similar way. Thus, when looking for a friend's house one may be told: "Keep straight on and you can't miss it". Painfully aware of one's capacity to miss the obvious, one may fail to be reassured by this prophecy. Yet it may be justified; and when one sees one's friend's house one may appreciate why it could be made. Similarly, one must have had certain experiences to appreciate why some experiences have been called self-authenticating.

It can also be pointed out that at least an element of self-authentication attaches to many of our cognitive experiences. Thus, we may set out to look for something without knowing what it is, impelled by an indeterminate longing. Yet faced by an object, an occupation, or an activity we may instantly recognise that it is what we have been looking for. Our response to what we find guarantees that it is the true object of our search. The religious man goes in quest of God, either alone or supported by the beliefs and practices of a religious community; and he knows when he has found Him by the overwhelming religious signifi-

cance of the encounter. He has met God when it is only God Whom he could have met, i.e., when he has met the Being in Whom he can find his fulfilment.¹⁰ This may sound like the perfect vindication of the psychological objection, since it can at once be suggested either that the mystic's voyage is one of disguised self-discovery (similar to that which reaches its completion when a man suddenly discovers that what he really wants to do is to paint), or that the whole voyage is a self-deception like that of an ancient mariner setting sail in his dreams for the wonderful port that he has never visited. The response of the mystic, it will be said, is like that of the dying man to the mirage; God is the oasis that should, that must exist — that would exist if thought really had the omnipotence that children and primitives ascribe to it. But just as the ordinary romantic youth is prepared to trade in his dreams for any pretty girl of flesh and blood, discovering that his response to the pretty girl is very different from, and goes far beyond, his response to any figure of fantasy; so the overwhelming power of the mystic's final encounter argues the Presence of a Being Who is more than a figment of his own imagination. Moreover, it is not the sickly and highly emotional who, in contemplative orders, have sometimes reached the level (as they claim) of fully self-authenticating experience; the greatest mystics appear to have been eminently sane men with a handsome disrespect for the phenomena of hysteria, self-hypnosis, and the like. Nobody, for example, can read St. John of the Cross with an open mind without being checked between facile explanations. Indeed, it may be asserted more generally that one can turn to the writings of the mystics after forty years of Freudian investigation without receiving an impression of psychological naivety. In brief, the mystery of self-authentication is more than sheer mystification, and a comparison of the mystic's claims with those of a man who is pronouncing on the peculiarities of his after-images is simply fatuous.

Finally, it is instructive to consider other cases in which the hideous cry of "Self-authentication" would echo just as deafeningly among the ivory towers of philosophy. Let us suppose that there is a community consisting of three people, A, B, and C. They are all blind but otherwise normal. Their scientific knowledge has reached a very high level so that they have been able to develop scientific aids which fulfil all the

¹⁰ As P. T. Geach says, "in 'God exists' we are not predicating something of God, but predicating the term 'God' itself; 'God exists' means 'something or other is God' ". See *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1954-55, p. 266.

functions of eyes with a single exception. Let us now suppose that A suddenly discovers that he can see. He tries to tell B and C about his extraordinary experiences but finds them intransigently sceptical when it is discovered that his alleged new sense gives him no predictive advantages that can be appreciated by the others. Thus as his visual experience increases he can predict colour changes that they cannot predict; but they are unimpressed by these predictions, since they question the existence of colours in A's sense. (However, they discover that his alleged colour predictions are correlated with predictable changes in what we call light waves. Thereafter they are inclined to say in the manner of Braithwaite that A's colour words function as parts of his descriptions of the anomalous experiences caused by these changes.) Inevitably, A becomes a target for the psychological and verificationist objections. He then discovers that he can often make the same predictions as the others with fewer scientific aids. After protracted tests B and C agree that he can. But when he makes existential claims on the basis of his visual experiences they immediately look stern and warn him against "self-authentication". He insists that looking at things is itself a way of verifying that they exist and have certain properties, but this they refuse to admit; and the logic of use supports them since, in this community, verification has nothing whatever to do with seeing. I suggest that the objection to mystical experience on the ground that it is self-authenticating may be as pointless as this objection to A's "self-authenticating" visual experiences.

The same point can be brought out by considering another case — the impact of a stranger with extraordinary clairvoyant powers on a community of normal men. P, Q, and R — the local intellectuals — are forced to admit after extensive tests that Z can describe things which are out of sight as accurately as a normal man describes things that are fully visible and close at hand. Nevertheless, they refuse to allow him to make existential claims on the basis of these powers alone, on the ground that this would mean that his clairvoyant experiences were to be regarded as self-authenticating. Z points out that he "makes sure" before asserting anything, "looking" again and again as a man might look at something near him; but they insist that what Z "sees" in this way must be checked by what he and others see in the ordinary way. But surely P, Q, and R are being unreasonable? A community in which men had reliable clairvoyant powers would have a logic that permitted them to test existential and all other cognitive claims by the use of those powers. Indeed, clairvoyant perception might count for more than seeing, since it might give

rise to fewer errors, e.g., those caused by the refraction of light, etc.¹¹

To all this it may be objected, however, that A and Z do not claim certainty for the statements they make on the basis of their visual or clairvoyant experiences, whereas the mystic does. But such a criticism fails to distinguish between logical and empirical certainty. A and the mystic both say they are certain; but neither is making his claims analytic — as Martin suggests. Thus, the mystic does not say “You *couldn't* have these experiences and at the same time sincerely deny God's existence”. It remains logically possible for the mystic to stop short of the existential claim. But it appears to be empirically impossible. In this it is similar to the run of everyday assertions. Thus, a man may have smelt, felt, and seen hundreds of lampreys, yet his dying words, having eaten a surfeit of them, may still be — “there's no such animal”. This is logically possible; but in a sincere, sane man with a good knowledge of the language it is empirically impossible.

Turning now to the charge that there are no tests in the field of religious experience, I first wish to point out that one can only reasonably ask for those tests which take account of the general nature of the field in which a claim is being made. The claims that A can see, that he is less anxious as a result of psychotherapeutic treatment, that he loves B, and that he has added a column of figures correctly are all different in important ways; and therefore the procedures by which they are tested must also be significantly different. Philosophers, in recent times, have often been unreasonable in what they have said about verification, insisting on paradigm procedures that they knew to be inapplicable to the field in which certain claims had been made. Some, for example, impugned the objectivity of history because its hypotheses could not be shown to be objective in the same ways, or in the same sense, as the hypotheses of science. But history was too respectable a study to be safely attacked for long, particularly by those with the built-in conventionality which comes from basing oneself on the ordinary usages of language. Religion has therefore become a popular object of old-style attack — even although nobody has ever supposed that the methods of verification used in scientific work can also be used to test religious claims.

But are there any tests whatsoever in the field of religious experience? In my view there are. Something can be done to

¹¹ To this it might be objected that my use of the word “reliable” refers back to such tests as creatures like myself are able to employ. But this criticism misses a big point in order to make a small one. The big point is that one's native constitution might be such that clairvoyance provided one with part of one's criteria of reliability.

understand these tests by returning to A, B and C. A is clearly extending the meaning of the term "exist" when he claims that it should have no closer connexions with what we hear than with what we see. He is unimpressed by C's ingenious objections to this extension, knowing that they represent "the empiricism of one who has had little experience".¹² Let us now suppose that the blindness of A, B and C has been due to some psychological disorder and that A does not suddenly develop the power of sight but accidentally undergoes some mildly therapeutic experience as a result of which he manages to detect the faintest glimmerings of light. He then slowly develops a therapeutic technique which eventually enables him to achieve normal vision. B and C can now test A's claims by using the technique that A has developed. With his assistance they may also improve it, so that, if we now suppose the community to be a larger one in which this form of blindness is endemic, a greatly improved therapeutic technique may eventually come into general use. Much may also be learnt about the stages in which correct vision is developed and the steps which have to be taken to ensure that misleading visual phenomena, such as "seeing stars", etc., are not cultivated instead of those which A, and other competent judges, know to be desirable.

The position of the mystic is somewhat similar to A's. His claims can only be tested if others, observing the changes in him or recognising that he has travelled further along the same road as themselves, are induced to follow him. But following the mystic is a very much more complex and arduous undertaking than following A. To begin with, he insists that the religious quest is one in which progress is only made by those who give it pride of place in their lives. It therefore involves a commitment with pervasive and sometimes distasteful implications. Furthermore, one requires to have faith not only in those things which bear some resemblance to a technique, i.e., religious exercises and forms of worship, but also in the creeds and codes of behaviour which are also deemed essential.¹³ It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that few who live outside the religious communities make a sustained and intensive effort to test these claims. Within

¹² J. S. Mill's criticism of Bentham. See *Mill on Bentham and Coleridge*, p. 62.

¹³ The "experiment" has certain features which are not fully paralleled in any other. Thus, one has to commit oneself not only to making a certain experiment but to believing that it will have a certain outcome; one must have faith in the mystic and in the God Whom he is inviting one to seek. Of course, men have often staked their lives on the result of an experiment. But the same experiment might have been successfully conducted — or another experiment designed to test the same claims — with less at stake. When the stakes are less than this in the religious experiment its results are invariably negative. Some "experiments" in the field of human relations are somewhat similar. I am indebted to Mr. Arthur Burns for stressing this vital difference to me in discussion.

the religious communities, on the other hand, they have been continuously tested over the centuries, and the stages through which the believer must pass — which vary with the nature of his religious gifts, etc. — have been very fully charted in relation to his goal. At the same time, experience has exposed the pitfalls and cul-de-sacs which he must avoid and the dangerous places where he must travel with special care. As a result, a spiritual director can make confident judgments regarding the extent and depth of the experience of those whom it is his duty to guide, basing them partly on what they have to tell him about their religious life and partly on how they behave.

All this would seem to be a perfectly adequate system of testing — one that can be studied in a very extensive literature which shows a continuous interest in, and awareness of, the problems of verification.

NOTE. There are other points which I might make about testing that I do not feel justified in elaborating in this paper. The most important of these is that verification is affected not only by the nature of the field in which claims are to be tested but also by the dominant concepts and interests of the society in which they are made. The whole subject is therefore much more complex than it has sometimes been made to seem in the more parochial pronouncements of the logical positivists and their successors.

III

The objection which bases itself on the ineffable or inexpressible nature of religious experience is even more important than it is common, not least because the mystics and their followers are concerned to stress the same facts as the critics and sceptics. The objection is as trenchantly stated by A. J. Ayer as by any other contemporary writer. “. . . To say that something transcends the human understanding”, he writes, “is to say that it is unintelligible. And what is unintelligible cannot be significantly described If one allows that it is impossible to define God in intelligible terms, then one is allowing that it is impossible for a sentence both to be significant and to be about God. If a mystic admits that the object of his vision cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it.”¹⁴

It would seem to be obvious that this objection is likely to have more force against some claims than against others

¹⁴ *Language, Truth, and Logic*, 2nd Edition, p. 118.

propose briefly to consider its impact on the following sorts of claims so far as they rest on religious experience:

- (i) That God exists.
- (ii) That God has certain attributes.
- (iii) That one's religious experiences provide one with reasons for conceiving God in certain ways rather than in others.

The objection strikes at the second sort of claim with greater force than at either of the others. In fact, at first sight it seems quite fatal to claims of this kind. But a second look may dispose one to think otherwise. Thus, it might be maintained that such claims are risky but possible inductions. Consider A's claim that B loves him. "What makes you think so?" someone asks. "Because with her I've felt — well, I can't describe it." "If you can't describe it, how does it help?" "But that's just it — you can be sure when you feel like that that they really love you." It might be said that the claim that God loves us is founded on experience in just the same way as A's claim. But such an answer is inadmissible since it overlooks the fact that A can only use his indescribable feelings as a test of B's love because there are many women and he has been able to establish the reliability of this test by first using other tests of women's feelings for him. The mystic cannot make such inductions, first, because there is only one God, and secondly because, *ex hypothesi*, he has no non-experiential methods of establishing God's love for him.

But what if it should be said — perhaps by someone who recalls the abundance of negations in the writings of the mystics — that ineffable experiences may be negative guides to what something is like? Suppose we say that the position of the mystic is similar to that of B when something brushes against her in the darkness and she finds she cannot describe it. "Did it seem hard?" A asks. "No." "Then did it seem soft?" "No. it didn't seem soft either. Oh, I can't describe it. It just felt — funny." But while such cases show that one can reject a description without being able to offer another in its place, one's disavowals are useless if they extend to every possible description — and it is certainly the case that the mystic refuses to accept any description of his experiences. (He writes about them in ways which prove to be evocative to his fellow mystics.) Therefore, this defence must also be rejected. However, experiences such as B's are useful because they help to remind us that when one says that x is indescribable one is not saying that it is featureless; for that which cannot be described may still be recognised when

it recurs. Thus, although mystics insist that their experiences are ineffable they do classify them to some extent and are sometimes prepared to say that they have had a certain kind of experience a definite number of times.

It seems, therefore, that the ineffable character of mystical experience rules out claims of the second kind. But I fail to see how it can be used against the assertion that God exists. As I have already tried to show, experience may give us sufficient warrant for extending the meaning of the word "exist" (or any other word); and even in ordinary life existential claims are made when one cannot describe what it is that one is affirming the existence of. Thus, when B says "something bumped into me", she will not withdraw the existential claim when she finds she can neither identify the object nor accept any suggested description of it. But to make such a comparison is calculated to stir the critic. "Yes", he may say, "B persists in making an existential claim. But she only does so — and other people are only interested in her claim — because she thinks that something unidentified is present and wishes to enlist other people's assistance in identifying it, lest it should prove to be dangerous or otherwise important. If, after repeated efforts, it cannot be identified she will either withdraw the existential claim or say combatively, 'Well, I know that *something* bumped into me'. In either case other people will cease to take an interest in it; and if B often has such experiences they will quickly come to the conclusion that she is mentally deranged. The mystic, on the other hand, is asserting the existence of something and at the same time insisting that it cannot be identified. This is very different." Much of what I am supposing the critic to say about B's experience seems to me sound. But he is neglecting certain possibilities. Thus, it might transpire that other people had had experiences similar to B's when walking in the same locality and that in no case had it been found possible to identify what it was that bumped into them. In such circumstances an existential claim might continue to be made without any description being given of what it is that is being asserted to exist. "But", I will be told, "this claim will only be made for the same reason as before, namely, the possibility that further investigation will uncover the nature of this mysterious something-or-other. If no amount of investigation serves to advance our knowledge the claim will be withdrawn and the experience will be regarded as of a 'distinctively mental kind'." I should agree that this is the probable course of events; but I should want to stress its unsatisfactoriness. However, even if one ignores this unsatisfactoriness an alternative remains, namely,

that which is embodied in the mystic's claims. Thus, it might be found that the unknown *x*, which bumps into people, eludes description not because it cannot be identified but because it can only be identified in a special way. This is what mystics have said about God. Thus, it is not pointless for them to say that God exists even when they admit that He cannot be described, since they also affirm that He can be apprehended in a special way by those who seek Him. Of course, one can rule out the special non-conceptual form of apprehension spoken of by mystics as nonsensical. But if one does one is denying the meaningfulness and appositeness of an expression without having had the experiences which give it meaning and establish its appositeness—a procedure that puts one in reach of the criticism which J. S. Mill levelled at Bentham.

Again, I do not think the objection has any force against claims of the third kind, e.g., against the claim that it is best to think of God as a loving God. The mystic, in his highest spiritual flights, does not require a conception of God: at such times (if we believe him) he enjoys direct communion with God, and the special form of consciousness to which he has attained is one that has no use for concepts. But for the ordinary course of his life, and for the instruction of others, the mystic requires a conception of God. Clearly, it is a good reason for conceiving God in this way rather than in that, that it has been found that this way is the more conducive to spiritual progress, i.e., to more profound and indubitable encounters with God. Of the conceptions and descriptions that are the most useful of all it can be said that they are as true as truth can be, the point of this unfashionable statement being that they are the best spiritual ladders available, but that one comes to the end of the longest ladder and must therefore eventually discard them. Ayer simply ignores the possibility of claims of this kind.

In my view, therefore, the force of the objection which Ayer raises depends on the nature of the claim against which it is directed. It is as fatal to claims of the second variety as it is harmless when brought against claims of the first and third. But it is these latter sorts of claims which are vital to mysticism. Claims of the sort which cannot be sustained in the face of this attack are precisely the sort of claims which are clearly inconsistent with even the most obvious and familiar features of mysticism.

It has become obvious that I do not think the recent philosophical critics of mysticism have succeeded in dislodging the believer from what I take to be his ultimate stronghold. But

I recognise that my rebuttals are most unlikely to convince those who are not sympathetically inclined towards mysticism. This is partly due to such factors as my own intellectual deficiencies. But it is also due to the difficulty of bringing critic and believer into effective touch with one another. One feels this in the course of reading even *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, although the contributors (Christian and non-Christian) have a common philosophical method; and it is still more obviously true when the believer is either a mystic or one who follows him from afar. In such a case the critic is like an elephant, the believer like a whale, and their combat is apt to have the unreality of a schoolboy frolic in which "dead" and "living" dispute as to which is which. In a disagreement of this kind there must come a point when the whale can only tempt the elephant by hinting at the marvels of underwater life, and the elephant can only stamp his feet, indicating that it is he who stands on solid ground. But there is a vital difference between them; for Leviathan, the father of the whales, will only be found — if he is found at all — by those who venture from the land.

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DISCUSSION

NECESSARY BEING

By P. Æ. HUTCHINGS

R. L. Franklin's article "Necessary Being" (this *Journal*, August, 1957) raises certain issues that are so important that I feel he cannot be left in undisputed possession of the field.

The remarks which follow seem to me to be less well made than I would like, and I should have wished to argue each point of Franklin's paper with the closeness of reasoning with which he puts it, but this would have produced an intolerably long reply.

* * * *

In discussion with continental Thomists I have often found it almost impossible to put, out of context, Wittgenstein's view on the status of epistemological problems; likewise it is extraordinarily difficult to wrench certain arguments for the existence of God from the context of Scholastic philosophical analysis. It is a job that would daunt anyone but a Garrigou-Lagrange, and it might have been better if he had paused. This at least must be said, that the "third way" of St. Thomas arises in a philosophical context where the central notion is *being*. This term is defined in use by Scholastics at extraordinary length, and I am not going to venture a short and almost certainly misleading definition of it, but Thomism with the ontological strain left out or misunderstood is a Holmesless Watson. The point cannot be elaborated here, but the burden of it is that I am not prepared to concede that St. Thomas was a Leibnizian *malgré lui*.

I wish to make at length the further point that I do not think a certain sort of Leibnizianism can be dismissed as easily as Franklin would dismiss it.

1.0. The Thomistic arguments for the existence of God go something like this: in this universe which we ordinarily take as "given" we *explain* states of affairs by relating them to other states of affairs, and most of our questions are of the form, "why is it like that?" "Why is it . . ." is usually the beginning of a sentence that goes on ". . . that x is so-and-so?" Existence is taken for granted—there are no *everyday* problems about existence, we do not normally ask "why is it" *simpliciter*, but there is no reason why we should not.

Then, the argument continues: if we ask "why is it?" of anything, we can mean this in the philosophically exciting sense in which it is a question about the existence of a thing (or of things in general) apart from the usual, and usually correct, taking for granted of existence. If we refuse to take existence for granted we cannot be forced to withdraw the question "why existence?" as silly, *either* just because "why is it . . ." *usually* means "why, existence taken for granted, is $x \neq y$?" *or* because there is something that can be shown which makes it "obvious that existence!"

The answer "Things just are" is unhelpful: as unhelpful as "people just get cancer, you know", because a real puzzlement is met by a necessarily unsatisfying restatement of the very facts that puzzle.

A person asks: "Why should anything at all be?"; and he is convinced that he knows what the question means, and he can see that it is not a silly question in the sense that the answer stares him in the face (i.e. not a "why has this triangle three sides" silly question); then he goes on: "this unaccountability of things is (part of) what I mean by saying they are non-necessary. The existence, given, of the non-necessary forces me to conclude to the existence of the necessary".

If a person is bitten by the ontological dilemma, that experience is given but does not account for itself, then he must conclude to the existence of something necessary on the plane of being and (consequently) self-accounting on the plane of intelligibility. One sees Necessary Being in the Thomistic sense just as the specific answer to the ontological problem.

The ontological or existential approach can then be "reinforced" to taste, with something Leibnizian (if this label is not too misleading). The reinforcement is this: Necessary Being is the only conclusion possible to the ontological question, and the only "reasons" for refusing to answer the question are unthinkable (cf. 2.1 below); Necessary Being is the only candidate, and there must be said to be a successful candidate, so Necessary Being is the successful candidate.

There are still, I think, two distinct strands, the pure Thomist and the reinforced. Franklin deals with the latter (and not the former) and I think it can be defended against his attacks.

1.1. The proposition enunciating the existence of Necessary Being is a metaphysical one (in Wisdom's sense) in that it is compatible with all (or all "ordinary" and "available") states of affairs, but it does claim that there is another non-available and extraordinary "fact". The theist's universe of discourse contains one more fact than the atheist's.

There is the qualification to be added, of course, that some facts are *more or less* available, for example the facts of mystical experience, religious experience, the miraculous etc. These "extra" facts are sometimes considered as *direct* evidence for the existence of God, and sometimes as *confirmation*, the latter in that if God exists He is the *raison d'être* of these things in a special sense, that accounts for them and for their difference from ordinary experience.

2.0. The answer to "why is anything?" that goes "why should there be an answer to your question?" is most unhelpful; further, it really suggests nothing at all, for there *not* being an answer to this, or for that matter to any other, i.e. "ordinary", question, would never show itself in such a way as to stop the question's being asked. There is an even queerer aspect than this, however.

2.1. Mr. Franklin claims that he knows what it would be like for there not to be an answer to a causal question. I, on the other hand, think he is mistaken, and that he does not really know this at all; what he knows is what it is like *not to get an answer*, and to go on not getting one for ever so long, and as well he knows what it is for things not to exist.

It is all very well to say: "I know what there being no explanation would be, it would be for x A to be *the* explanation, but for there to be no x , i.e. for x in fact not to exist" (x standing for an entity, A for the "inference licence" from x to the phenomenon under consideration). But as Dr. Johnson asked in another context, "You may say it, sir, but can you mean it?": you can certainly *imagine* it, but can you do any more?

The puzzled scientist with everything otherwise going to plan, but there *being* no factor x which "is" the explanation of y , could never know that this was the case. As soon as he "found" that there was no x , i.e. when he got tired of looking for it, he would postulate a z , *wrongly* here, because x *is* the cause but there *is* no x . The scientist cannot help being wrong, because the good reasons for his postulating x and not z (i.e. that x *is* the explanation, but no- x) cannot ever show themselves. This is queer, on the side of its implications, and queerer still, I submit, *per se*. Consider what this means, not merely in practice (where it does not differ from an ordinary case of chronic un-success in investigation) but in itself: because we can set the scene x Ay, and annihilate mentally the x , we are then supposed to know what $\neg x$ Ay is. "You know now what it would be for there to be no explanation, it would be for it to be the case x Ay. $(\neg \exists x)x$ Ay." I certainly know what it is now, but this is a paradox: "*for there to be no explanation*" is not *elucidated* by equating it to

$xAy.(\neg\exists x)xAy$ because the latter is, as far as I can see, as much a paradox as the former.

I can picture a paradox, and I can design Tom and Jerry cartoons: but neither mental pictures nor Tom and Jerry cartoons have to obey "real" logic.

"Think of x causally related to y : think away x , leaving y ", and you have as neat a trap as Descartes' demon ever set the intellect. Perhaps, but it is too good; it can be pictured, but not thought, and pictures are not reasons.

Critic: Certainly this case is only an analogy, not an exact parallel. Well, let us suppose that there occurred from time to time events—say the coming into existence of things like pink rabbits, which later went out of existence again—which we just could not explain: i.e. no examination of the preceding physical conditions nor of the psychological states of the observers gave us a hint of what would be the necessary and sufficient A B C . . . for this x . Now I grant it would still be intelligible to say "there must be a reason for it". But wouldn't it also be intelligible to say "perhaps there isn't". Certainly it could not be proved: it would in fact be a counsel of despair, just as its opposite is a counsel of optimism. *But we would understand it.*

I for one would not understand it, *pied à lettre*: I could interpret it as "a counsel of despair", but neither that it was the case, nor that it was the case so I had good reasons for despair, would ever be other than opaque to my understanding. Whenever I recovered from my despair I could start again, because the dissuasion was the alleged existence of an incomprehensible state of affairs, which could ("further", but this is a joke) never show itself to be the case.

3.0. Franklin offers the theist not an explanation of the existence of things, but a *logical substitute* for an explanation (page 109), by undertaking to show that the dispute about the existence or non-existence of Necessary Being (which would be an explanation if there *were* any Necessary Being) is unseizable.

To show that something is unseizable is not to dissolve the puzzlement; what I want is my problem dissolved or solved, not an answer that, though it is a fair question (i.e. *indissolvable*) still I cannot have an answer. It may be the case that there are questions like this, but I am not convinced that the question about existence is one.

Franklin appears, in the first part of his article, to have abandoned the *simplicite* position that we cannot talk meaningfully

beyond experience, but he occupies later a less extreme positivist position partly akin to this.

Franklin gives this as the structure of an argument for the existence of God: Necessary Being would be an explanation of existence in general (and it is or would be the only possible explanation) but *is* it, i.e. does it exist to be the explanation? The question in the tail of this is, partly at least, the result of misunderstanding the pure Thomist position—and this is easy enough to do—and partly the result of taking the xAy scheme as the absolute paradigm of explanation. In the case of ordinary scientific explanations we may establish the hypothesis, which sets up xAy with values for the variables, and then say “let us go and look to see if there are x ’s”.

Now it is admitted that we cannot go to look for God in this way—there are no telescopes or geiger counters that will do this job of detection. Consequently if part of the criterion of an explanation’s being an explanation is the in-principle availability of x , then God cannot be an explanation in this sense.

If God could be an explanation in the way in which the anopheles mosquitoes are, then there would be no natural theology because we would all be as Moses presumably was on the mount, i.e. in possession of the facts, and looking for the connexions. But the senses of explanation in which empirical (in principle) phenomena explain other empirical phenomena, and God (non-empirical) explains the existence of things, are clearly *very* different. The difference is a double one: God is not like, and not available like, a phenomenon; the existential question is not about the “how” but the “that”, as Wittgenstein puts it. Even the notion of “inference licence” looks odd in the *God-A-world* context. But is anyone surprised at this? The remark, “but xAy is what we usually mean by explanations: you want to have a special sense”, can be made, but there are good reasons for wanting a special sense, and the theist is not impressed when he is told how unusual natural theology is: he knows already.

Franklin’s summary of points on p. 109, then, leaves the theist unmoved because:

- (a) if “why does anything exist at all?” is a legitimate question (and one is extremely grateful to Franklin for the pains he takes to establish that it is), then he will go on *en bon Thomist* to God by the usual moves;
- (b) he never thought God *was* an explanation in the Franklin sense of “explanation”.

4.0. In my experience of theists they do not usually put all their eggs in one basket, but some do. Most, like Newman, are

concerned with the "one obelisk at the end of each vista" approach. Mr. Franklin's defence of the reasonableness of theism would not be mine, not because I underrate what I may call the "coherence theory of the existence of God", but because one of the strong reasons for belief in God has always seemed to me the *unthinkability*, in a strict technical sense, of the "alternative". Mr. Franklin seems prepared to give this away, much as Hume (equally mistakenly, I think) gave away causality.

A theist can *think* God, not adequately it is true, but with models from logic and aesthetics. One can think God, and, with great skill if one has it, formulate concepts that will be communicable to other people: then one can relate this conceptual God to the facts by various sets of connexions. Some of these connexions come under the things labelled "faith" that philosophers do not usually talk of in office hours.

The "alternative" on the other hand has always struck me as not just unlikely on the evidence, but *unthinkable*: Mr. Franklin tries to persuade me, by the equivalence of what I take to be two fine paradoxes, that I know what it would be "for there to be no explanation", and here is the stalemate between us. I cannot see what he claims to be able to see, but I do not despair of convincing him yet.

This "rationalism", as much as what Franklin chooses to call the "being struck overwhelmingly by the contingency of the world", seems to me to provide the rational foundations of belief: it is a bit swift to call this conviction that there must be an explanation Leibnizian, but if I have been defending it perhaps then I have been defending Leibniz—a pity, as I prefer St. Thomas.

If Franklin's analysis were right as it stands I think it would serve only to drive theists into the arms of the simple-faithers; and if simple faith is all that stands between myself and atheism then I am ripe for the plucking hand of the league of the Godless.

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DREAMING AND SCEPTICISM: A REJOINDER

By NORMAN MALCOLM

Mr. Robert Brown tells us, in his discussion¹ of my article,² that there are "two *kinds* of sound sleep". One is "the sleep in which the person remains unconscious to external stimuli, but has genuine thoughts and emotions in dreams"; the other is "the sleep in which the person, whatever his physical state, has no dreams, thoughts or emotions" (Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 50). He says that "It is only this second type of sound sleep that Malcolm recognizes" (*ibid.*). The latter statement is false since in my article (p. 22) I explicitly say that it would be wrong to suppose that a person cannot dream when sound asleep. But this distinction of two kinds of sound sleep seems to be pure invention. The statement of it that I have just quoted is not very clear. Is the distinction merely this, that in one kind of sound sleep there are dreams and in the other not? How odd to speak of "two *kinds*" of sound sleep merely on the basis of this difference! Brown's meaning becomes clearer if we note the comparison he makes between the alleged two kinds of sound sleep and "the two ways in which a person can be unconscious" (p. 49). Of the latter Brown says: "He may be unconscious in the sense of simply being dead to the outside world. He may also be unconscious in the sense of having no mental life, no thoughts or emotions. A person may be unconscious in the first sense without being unconscious in the second" (p. 50). I take it that the two ways of being sound asleep that correspond to the two ways of being unconscious are the following: When a person is sound asleep in the first way he has "no mental life, no thoughts or emotions"; when he is sound asleep in the second way he does have mental life, thoughts and emotions. In the latter kind of sleep, says Brown, "a person can have emotions, can think, and . . . can perform tests" (*ibid.*). So apparently the distinction between the two sorts of sound sleep is not that in one there are dreams, in the other not; but rather that in the one there are emotions, thoughts, and so on, in the other not.

If a person can think thoughts and feel emotions while sound asleep, it ought to be possible for him to *express* his thoughts and feelings, either in words or behaviour, while sound asleep. I am assuming it to be an *a priori* truth that whenever a thought occurs to a person or he experiences a feeling he could, at the time, give

¹ "Sound Sleep and Sound Scepticism", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, May, 1957, pp. 47-53.

² "Dreaming and Skepticism", *The Philosophical Review*, January, 1956, pp. 14-37.

expression to the thought or feeling. I mean that this is always logically possible, not that it is always physically or psychologically possible. To deny this assumption would be to hold that sometimes it is logically impossible that a thought or feeling should be expressed, either in words or behaviour, at the time it occurs. And this would amount to holding, I think, that sometimes statements of the sort, "He felt anxiety and showed it", "It occurred to him that he had overdrawn his account and he said so", are either contradictory or nonsensical. I cannot believe that they ever are. Making this assumption then, it follows that if a person had certain thoughts and feelings while sound asleep, it would be logically possible for him to give expression to them, while sound asleep. It would be possible to say of someone, "While he was sound asleep the thought occurred to him that he had overdrawn his account and he said so"; or, "While sound asleep he felt anxiety and showed it". But I believe that these sentences will strike everyone as self-contradictory. The obvious and correct comment is: If he showed anxiety or said that he was overdrawn, then he was not sound asleep. (Of course a man talking in his sleep could make the sounds, "I am overdrawn," but he would not be *saying that* (claiming that) he is overdrawn. For the latter it would be necessary that he should know that he was speaking and know what he was saying, and if he knew these things he would not be *talking in his sleep*.) The conclusion to be drawn is that a person cannot have thoughts, feelings, "perform tests", and so on, while sound asleep. If it is logically impossible for a person to express or show thoughts, feelings, and so on, while sound asleep, then it is logically impossible for him to *have* them while sound asleep. Therefore, one of Brown's alleged kinds of sound sleep is not a possibility. I do not believe that Brown can break out of this argument except by refuting the assumption that I stated above, and I should like to see how he would go about that.

I turn to Brown's remarks about nightmares. Here he might have pointed out a genuine duality, not an imaginary one. There are, I think, two uses of the sentence, "He had a nightmare". In one use, "nightmare" really means *a horrible dream*, and our basis for stating that someone had a nightmare is his testimony that he had a horrible dream. It is not implied that he struggled or cried out while in bed. He may have satisfied the criteria for being sound asleep. Thus, in this use, a person may have a nightmare when sound asleep. But here we must not confuse the phrases "sound asleep" and "sound sleep", as Brown appears to do. We should not say that a man who had a nightmare, in this sense,

had a sound sleep (slept soundly). In saying that someone had a sound sleep we imply that his sleep *refreshed* him and did not leave him with an unpleasant or disturbing impression. But if he recalls a horrible dream he does have an unpleasant impression of his sleep, otherwise it would not be a *horrible* dream. So he may have been sound asleep for several hours, yet not have had a sound sleep.

In the second use of "He had a nightmare", our basis for saying it is that after going to sleep he begins to behave violently (to struggle, scream, etc.). We should say it, I think, even if, upon being fully awakened, he had no recollection of having dreamt. Notice that in this sense of "nightmare" we have a criterion for the use of the *present-tense* sentence "He is having a nightmare", whereas we have no criterion for the use of the present-tense sentence "He is dreaming" but only for the past-tense sentence "He dreamt." In this second sense of "nightmare" that he had a nightmare does not imply that he had a dream. Also, it is obvious that we should not think of saying that a person who is in the throes of a nightmare, in this sense, is *sound asleep*. Indeed, he is not even *asleep*, in the most common sense of "asleep" (no more than is a person in hypnotic trance); on the other hand, he is not *awake*, in the most common sense of "awake".

Brown raises a question about the *continuity* between the emotion of a nightmare and an emotion of waking life (p. 48). In the second sense of "nightmare" there is no possible difficulty for the thesis of my article, because my contention there is that a person who is sound asleep is not having thoughts, emotions, etc., and a person having a nightmare, in the second sense, is not sound asleep. But in the first sense, in which a nightmare is a bad dream, there is an interesting problem, namely, can the *very same* feeling that a man had in a nightmare-dream continue into his waking life? Can his waking anxiety be a continuation of his dream anxiety? Brown thinks that if the answer is affirmative my contention is overthrown.

The important question here is what constitutes the *identity* of a dream feeling or object. A man may see his mother in a dream. There is a philosophical inclination to say that it was not *really* his mother he saw, but an image or vision of her. But if he insists that he saw his mother in the dream then he did see *her*, and nothing less (even if she is long since dead). To see an image or vision of her would be a different dream. If you saw a certain man in a dream you might next day, when awake, point at someone in the street and exclaim "That is the very same

(identical) man I saw in my dream!" That would be right, for it was not *another* man. Suppose that in your dream you were angry at this man, and that the next day, when awake, you were angry at him. The feeling that you had toward him in your dream and the feeling you had toward him when awake would be the same in exactly that sense of "the same" in which it is *the same man* that you saw in your dream and saw when awake! Thus "continuity" (in a sense) between dreaming and waking is possible. But it still does not follow from the fact that you were angry at that man in your dream of last night that you were angry sometime last night, any more than it follows from the fact that you saw him in your dream that therefore you saw him sometime last night. Brown's question has an affirmative answer but the sense of it does not destroy my thesis.

Brown's article is in two parts. In the first part he tries to disprove my thesis (that a person cannot have thoughts and emotions while sound asleep). In the second he assumes, for the sake of argument, that this thesis is true,³ and goes on to claim that the sceptical problem, "How can I tell whether I am dreaming?" is not undermined thereby. Here I have difficulty in understanding him. He says that "it does no good to claim, as Malcolm does, that the dreamer cannot actually raise the question. He can dream that he raises it — and answers it. While still in the dream, he cannot (logically) distinguish his dreamt question from his waking question. It offers the dreamer no help for him to recall in his dream that if he is awake he can really tell that he is and that if he is asleep he cannot tell (logically) that he is sleeping. Nor can it help him to recall that Malcolm says both the question and the test are absurd" (p. 52). What does Brown mean by "helping" the dreamer? It sounds as if he were talking about a person who is posing himself a problem and needs help in solving it. Brown has apparently forgotten his own hypothesis, namely, that this dreamer is sound asleep and that a person cannot have thoughts, put questions to himself, perform tests, and so on, while sound asleep. There can be no question, therefore, of *helping him with a problem*. He may dream of a problem and dream that he needs help, and dream that he receives it. Does

³ I think that this is his intention although the first sentence of Part II actually reads, "Let us agree that the sound sleeper is completely unconscious to the *outside world*" (my italics), possibly implying that one who is sound asleep might be thinking to himself. However, in the preamble of his article, Brown, apparently summarizing what is to follow, says, "I suggest that it is a mistake to say that a person in a state of sound sleep can never (logically) be in any state of consciousness, and that *even if we grant this claim* we can yet show that the attack on The Sceptic's Question is misleading" (p. 47, my italics). This sentence seems to verify my interpretation of the plan of the article.

Brown think that I proposed a dream-solution to a dream-problem?

Finally, Brown wants to know why people ever ask themselves the question, "How can I tell whether I am dreaming?", and how do they assure themselves that they are not dreaming? He believes that sometimes people come to think that they *are* dreaming (*ibid.*). In the sense of "dreaming" in which if one were dreaming one would be sound asleep (which is presumably what both Brown and I are talking about) I find it hard to believe that anyone ever comes to think that he is dreaming, this conclusion being as absurd as the conclusion that he is unconscious. People do ask, "Am I dreaming?" and sometimes conclude, "I must be!"; but in the *actual use* of these sentences they have the same meaning as "Am I seeing (hearing) things?" and "I must be!" These sentences express one's incredulity or amazement upon being confronted, apparently, by something very unexpected or unlikely. "Am I dreaming?" no more questions whether the speaker is asleep than does "I can't believe my eyes!" The question, "How can I tell whether I am dreaming?", has, I think, no ordinary use at all but only a philosophical one. The treatment of this philosophical question in my article was certainly sketchy, but this is not the place to fill in the sketch.

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THE FEELING-STRIVING PROCESS

By A. CAMPBELL GARNETT

Under this title Dr. L. E. Palmieri, in the May 1957 issue of this *Journal*, presents a critique of a central part of the argument of my thesis in *The Moral Nature of Man*, which calls for a reply.

The argument in question is an empirical one which may be summed up all too briefly as follows. (1) Feeling-striving, as it appears to operate in animal organisms, and as we find it in ourselves, is primarily attentive to objects as objects rather than to states of the self as states of the self. (2) The interest in objects, thus developed in man, is primarily and predominantly constructive in the sense of being an interest in moulding them in ways that render them increasingly malleable and usable by life-activity such as our own. (3) Because of this basically objective and constructive trend of interest-activity or feeling-striving, as it operates in human beings, interests which run counter to it tend to be felt as inwardly disruptive and self-stultifying (and, indeed,

are so) and thus, with good reason, they come to be pronounced wrong. This argument is put forward as both an explanation and a justification of the tendency in ethical thinking to view the principle of impartial good will as stating the most basic and far-reaching requirement of the moral life.

In the book referred to the empirical evidence for this thesis is not elaborated in detail, but sketched in outline, and left for the reader to endorse or reject on the basis of his own experience and knowledge. Dr. Palmieri's first criticism is that the evidence as presented is inconclusive. This I should frankly admit, though I think that the nature of the evidence is sufficiently indicated for the reader to test it out of his experience and document it by reading, especially in recent studies of depth psychology. Dr. Palmieri, however, goes on to develop a second criticism. He argues that since Garnett's empirical evidence, here presented, is insufficient to prove his point, he must, in his own thinking, have arrived at that point by a semantic confusion — that the phrase, "the feeling-striving process", which is frequently used, is connected in Garnett's thought with a Platonistically conceived "The Feeling-Striving Process", the ideal characteristics of which are then made the basis of a moral demand that particular feeling-striving processes should conform to it. Such an argument would certainly be illegitimate and I can only protest that it never entered my head. Dr. Palmieri's criticism here appears to me as a rather gross example of reading something into another person's argument in order to criticize it.

For the use of the phrase "the feeling-striving process" I can only plead that it is a convenient term for feeling-striving processes in general and has the additional advantage of recognizing the continuity and inter-connection of all the feeling-striving processes in the life of a single individual. In regard to the inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence presented I can only plead that elaboration in detail of the empirical evidence for the five points listed (cf. Palmieri's discussion, this *Journal*, p. 55) would be a tedious business and belongs in works on depth psychology and social psychology rather than philosophy. These are sciences in which most generalizations are still very tentative and there is much disagreement, but I think there is a strong trend in support of the points on which I have based my argument. One of the best studies of this kind, to my mind, is Erich Fromm's *Man For Himself* and to this I would refer Dr. Palmieri and any others who do not find sufficient evidence for them in reflection on their own experience.

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CRITICAL NOTICES

LOGIC AND LANGUAGE (Second Series). Edited with an introduction by Antony Flew. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. 242 p. 21s. (U.K.).

(The reviewer apologises for the lateness of this notice, which was completed in 1954 but was mislaid in transit to the Editor.)

This collection of essays is a successor to the one reviewed by J. A. Passmore in Volume XXX, No. 3, of this *Journal*. Of contributors to the First Series only Professor Ryle and Dr. Waismann are represented here. Apart from Waismann's "Language Strata", G. J. Warnock's "'Every Event has a Cause'" and D. F. Pears' "Incompatibilities of Colours", all the essays have been published before. What the editor states of Dr. Waismann, that he has modified the views expressed in his paper, no doubt holds also of some of the other contributors, since the dates of publication range back to the late 30's.

Mr. Flew's arguments for the philosophical importance of the "new linguistic techniques and linguistic insights" (p. 8)—which the present volume, like the previous one, is supposed to illustrate—are oblique and unconvincing, because he habitually concentrates on questions to which he would get a favourable answer but which just fall short of being the main questions.

Of the papers themselves, Professor Gasking's "Mathematics and the World" (XI) will already be familiar to readers of this *Journal*, where it first appeared (September, 1940). A. M. McIver's "Historical Explanation" (X) raises some interesting issues, but hardly qualifies for a piece of linguistic analysis. Dr. Will's essay on induction, "Will the Future be like the Past?", qualifies only by the skin of its teeth. After a laborious build-up, the main point he makes is a slight one, viz. that we have to distinguish two senses of "future", the future which does come and the future which does not. It would be a poor sort of sceptic whose faith was shaken by this.

A technique which occurs in many of the remaining essays and gives them a certain unity—though its prominence varies as does the degree of indispensability with which it is regarded—is that of comparing one linguistic expression with others of apparently the same form, especially when the first expression is troublesome and the others are not. This technique occurs in

G. E. Moore's "Is Existence a Predicate?" (V), e.g. the comparison of "Tame tigers exist" and "Tame tigers growl"; in Professor Austin's "Other Minds" (VIII), e.g. the comparison of "How do you know that man is angry?" and "How do you know that is a goldfinch (bittern, etc.)?"; in J. O. Urmson's "On Grading", the comparison of grading a man as "good" and an apple e.g. as "super"; in Warnock's "Every Event has a Cause", e.g. the comparison of "There are some conditions sufficient for the occurrence of E" and "There once was or is or will be, somewhere in the universe, a person who has green hair".

What is crucial to Warnock's argument is the transition *from* (1) the impossibility of any event occurring which it would be necessary or natural to describe as uncaused or of which we should be able to assert that none of its antecedents could be said to be sufficient for its occurrence *to* (2) the possibility of our affirming that every event has a cause no matter what occurred, i.e. the causal law's independence of the actual course of events and compatibility with anything and everything that does or might happen (cf. esp. pp. 106-7). But the fact that, in our discussions, we can bring to bear on the causal law only our knowledge or beliefs about "the course of nature", and not the course of nature itself, does not establish that the causal law is independent of the course of nature as well as of our knowledge or beliefs unless we take as read the doctrine formulated in various ways by Protagoras, Peirce, James and Schiller, and by exponents of the verifiability principle. It is hardly accidental that the conclusions of many of the essays in this book have a certain kinship with the dominant non-linguistic philosophies of the era in which the linguistic movement developed.

Consider the verbal exchange: "This is good." "Why?" "Because this is ABC and whatever is ABC is good." "But I don't agree that whatever is ABC is good: my criteria are DEF." The "logic" of this exchange, Urmson tells us in "On Grading" (IX), is as follows. "This is good" irreducibly grades, i.e. it does not describe or classify and cannot be reduced to any sentence which does, but is none the less decidable. "This is ABC" attributes to the thing in question empirical features which purport to justify the grading of it as good, and consequently does describe and is decidable.

But "Whatever is ABC is good" does not grade or describe or classify. It expresses a relation which resembles in some respects the relation between possessing the legal qualifications for a right and actually possessing that right, and thus is neither analytic nor synthetic. What are we to do, then, when there is a conflict about criteria for applying the grading label "good",

i.e. when one person wants to use ABC as criteria and another person wants to use DEF? One way of deciding the issue, Urmson thinks, is to consider which set of criteria is the more "enlightened" (another grading label). "If people have not agreed criteria for enlightenment", he says (p. 185), "I do not know what one can do about it."

In view of his account of the logic of the situation, it would be difficult to match Urmson's ingenuity in bringing out the truth of various apparently opposed moral theories and their mutual accord. I suppose the trouble about "enlightenment", although he does not make the point, would be that we can hardly expect to decide conflicts about the empirical criteria for grading something as "enlightened" by asking which set of criteria is the more enlightened. But what other criteria could we use?

The question of enlightenment does not arise only with regard to criteria for grading labels. In fact, it seems to arise with regard to usage in general: with regard to the descriptive and classificatory use of words as well as their grading use. If Urmson's account of the "logic" of the use of the word "good" is correct, it shows that the use of this word is not yet a logically enlightened use, i.e. a disinterested use. To try to erect a moral theory on such a use would be as futile as trying to erect an epistemological theory on the performatory use of the word "know" (cf. Austin's "Other Minds", pp. 143 ff.).

But I doubt whether Urmson's account is as comprehensive in explanatory power as it seems. Not all usage and not all theories are in accord with the interpretation of "This is good" as irreducibly grading. Even if Urmson were right about this, there is no reason why those who want to develop a theory of "goodness" should acquiesce in the position he outlines. One job of a philosopher might be to change usage, even if it is not to change the world, especially in studies which no sooner set sail than they seem to be caught in the doldrums.

In his discussion of Wisdom's views, "Other Minds" (VIII), Austin shows (p. 133) how the "profound and puzzling" character of such questions as "How do you know it's a real goldfinch?" or "How do you know that he is really angry?" derives from the "wile of the metaphysician" in not specifying "what may be wrong with it", e.g. that the bird may be a stuffed goldfinch or that the man may be feigning anger. But Austin seems to think that the use of such expressions as "real" and "unreal" to indicate the presence and absence of various specific features is evidence against what some would regard as a philosophical view, the view that "'real' has a single meaning ('the

real world', 'material objects')". It would be a rash philosopher who ventured the semantical opinion that "real" has a single meaning, even though he might speak in this way when he was not concerned with semantics at all. If anything, Austin's remarks confirm a certain philosophical view, because the stuffed goldfinch is just as much a material object as the live one would have been, and feigned anger is often more obviously material than genuine anger is.

Despite the acuteness of many of his observations about psychology and epistemology and the levelling effect of the parallels which he draws, Austin's arguments weaken at important points because of his respect for views which have a linguistic sanction, something which is particularly obvious from his countenancing expressions, e.g. "feeling a pain", which run together the notions of having a pain and knowing that you have one, and from his remark (Note 1, p. 152): "A new language is naturally necessary if we are to admit unconscious feelings, and feelings which express themselves in paradoxical manners, such as the psychoanalysts describe."

There are many observations scattered throughout the book which might pass for linguistic insights and which, though they are not especially philosophical in content, might steer philosophers past certain blind alleys. For example, D. F. Pears' "Universals" (III) describes and explains certain problem-raising sentences that occur in talk about meaning, especially those by means of which philosophers claim that "Universals exist" is a factual answer to the question "Why can we name things as we do?". His general conclusion is that such talk is "the result of the Protean metaphysical urge to transcend language". In his other paper, "Incompatibilities of Colours" (VIII), he tries to supplement and qualify a certain view in such a way that it becomes defensible, viz. the view that the sentence "Nothing can be red and green all over" is necessary, but neither analytic nor synthetic, and that both nature and convention conspire to produce it. This paper too has a certain general bearing because of its eventual rejection of the schematism laid down by traditional theories of meaning, especially as it affects sentences.

It is easy to have doubts and dissatisfactions similar to those of Pears, but it is difficult to present them in discussible form. Pears fortifies his theses with such a multitude of intricate manoeuvres that it would be impossible to formulate any of his arguments clearly and briefly. However, it would be interesting to know his detailed views about what is expressed by the sentence "Nothing can be red and green all over" as distinct from the sentence itself. If the attack on direct techniques of

philosophical discussion—which are not techniques which dispense with language—depended on the views to which Pears *seems* to be committed, it would be more dependent on pragmatism and nominalism than it need be. Pears' nominalism is especially clear in some of the epithets, e.g. "true", which he attaches to sentences, in his account of the circularity in "red means red" and " ϕ means ϕ ", and in the extent to which he is prepared to assimilate describing something as red to calling something "red".

Two of the essays stand out because of the generality of their claims: Ryle's "Categories" (IV) and Waismann's "Language Strata" (I). I might have said that these two essays, together with Austin's account of the "descriptive fallacy" (pp. 146 ff.), set the tone of the collection, but for the fact that Moore's "Is Existence a Predicate?" is not only the most convincing essay in linguistic techniques but also gives obvious clues to the principles underlying these techniques.

As with most of Moore's best work, we get the impression that his succeeding in not saying certain things is at least as important as anything he says, and that his way of saying what he does say is unspeakably more important than what he says. Two main steps may be distinguished in Moore's use of the linguistic techniques. First, there is the construction of two sets of sentences whose members are identical except in this respect, that where a sentence in the first set has "exist" or "exists" the corresponding sentence in the second set has "growl" or "grows": "Tame tigers exist", "All tame tigers exist", "Some tame tigers do not exist"; "Tame tigers growl", "All tame tigers growl", "Some tame tigers do not growl".

Second, there is the comparison of the one set of sentences with the other (a) in respect of the "logical" relations that hold among its sentences and (b) in respect of the meaningfulness of its sentences. Broadly, the conclusion Moore reaches is that if, when we say "growl" or "grows" stands for a predicate and "exist" or "exists" does not, we mean that certain logical relations hold among certain sentences in the second set which do not hold among the corresponding sentences in the first set, and that certain sentences in the second set are meaningful and the corresponding sentences in the first set not, then he agrees that existence is not a predicate.

Theorists who adopt a certain standardised language not merely because it is a useful deductive instrument but because it conveniently indicates their philosophical principles or hypotheses would not be satisfied with Moore's result. They would say that his neat exposition of linguistic differences is at most a

convenient starting-point for some philosophising; that philosophers and logicians have been aware of the linguistic differences he mentions, but have been more concerned with explaining them than with listing them; that when it comes to explanation Moore puts the cart before the horse, because he takes the meaning of "Existence is not a predicate" to reside in certain linguistic peculiarities of the verb "to exist", whereas the real problem is to put such an interpretation on this sentence as would be true even if there were no languages at all, but nevertheless accounts for the linguistic peculiarities he mentions.

The feature of Moore's result which makes it both a lame result and a philosophically interesting one is that, while it reveals between the verb "to exist" and the verb "to growl" such differences as incline Moore to agree that existence is not a predicate, it allows that "Tame tigers exist" and "Tame tigers do not exist" are just as meaningful as the corresponding sentences with "growl" instead of "exist". The philosophically and logically interesting question is how "exist" can function as a significant grammatical predicate even though existence is not a predicate. In order to answer this question Moore would have to abandon purely linguistic techniques and make a deeper incursion into logical theory than he does.

The most important contribution to general philosophy in the volume is Professor Ryle's essay on categories. A proposition of philosophy, he says, is a category proposition, an assertion that a proposition-factor belongs to a certain category or type. Locke, Meinong, Mill, Russell and others have so described that which belongs to a category or that to which a category applies as to suggest that there is only one category, viz. idea, object, thing, term. "So I use 'proposition-factor'," Ryle says (p. 77), "intending it to have all possible type-ambiguities, to collect whatever is signified by any expression, simple or complex, which can be a complement to a gap-sign in some sentence-frame or other. . . . Of course, we could dispense with any such word. Its functions are purely stenographic."

To ask the question: To what type or category does a proposition-factor belong?, according to Ryle (p. 76), is to ask in what sorts of true or false propositions and in what positions in them it can enter. "Or, to put it semantically, it is to ask: In what sorts of non-absurd sentences and in what positions in them can the expression 'so and so' enter? and, conversely, What sorts of sentences would be rendered absurd by the substitution for one of their sentence-factors of the expression 'so and so'?"

One cannot help feeling that there is something wrong with a definition of "proposition of philosophy" which excludes from

philosophy (because they are not category propositions) Ryle's answers to the questions: To what do categories apply? and: What are categories? If Ryle replied that these answers belong to meta-philosophy, his troubles would not be over: there are propositions about the interrelations of categories or types, which are not category propositions in the required sense, but nevertheless seem to belong to philosophy.

Ryle's treatment of the expression "proposition-factor", if intended to avoid the sort of trouble Locke, Mill, Meinong and Russell encountered, is excessively drastic unless his view is closer to theirs than immediately appears; that is, unless he takes proposition-factors, failing his stenographic view of "proposition-factor", to be necessarily "things", as his sentence-factors seem to be. At any rate, Ryle does not clearly show that, failing his stenographic view, it is as necessary to treat proposition-factor as itself a category as it is so to treat, say, idea in Locke's theory.

The suspicion that Ryle hardly escapes logical atomism is partly confirmed by consideration of the set of categories he would arrive at by his method. We should not expect this set to coincide with any traditional set, because Ryle's method is comparatively straightforward, whereas traditional exponents of the doctrine of categories have often proceeded in a very mysterious way. But clearly some of the categories revealed by Ryle's method do not seem to be of immediate philosophical importance, e.g. the category of the significatum of "that it", of "but not at", of "and how". Conversely, some of the notions that have been called categories and are philosophically important, e.g. being, causation, necessity, contingency, identity, difference, are not *prima facie* derivable by the method. None of these "categories" is a type of "thing", and the reference to philosophical importance is not irrelevant in view of Ryle's definition of "proposition of philosophy".

Similar questions arise about Ryle's contention that "to know all about the logical form of a proposition and to know all about the logical types of its factors are to know one and the same thing" (p. 71). One important feature of a genuine proposition is that its virtual subject and predicate terms are different (cf. Ryle, top of p. 78). In sentences this is usually indicated by using different signs, just as the sameness of terms in an argument is indicated by using the same sign. I do not see how Ryle's method could reveal this type of feature, which none the less contributes to the form of a proposition.

It is possible that if all sentences were in "logical form", some genuine categories would be revealed by the method that might otherwise escape notice, and at least some spurious categories

would be discerned which might otherwise go undetected. But on logical form Ryle seems to have no systematic view, and I do not see how he could have such a view if he rejects the doctrine of "one sort of coupling" (p. 71). To reject this doctrine is to allow variability in the logical notions of subject, predicate, extension, class, intension, the predicables, validity, and so on; in which case it becomes impossible to see what "logical form" or "logic" could mean.

Ryle seems to treat all the categories as coordinate. While this may be the outcome of the most coherent interpretation of Aristotle, it seems to me that more justice is done to the doctrine by the principles imperfectly applied by Kant, Hegel, Bosanquet and Bradley, according to which, as we work from the simpler forms of proposition, e.g. the so-called "singular proposition", to the more complex forms, the categories appear in a definite order. The association of the category of causation with the hypothetical judgment is not altogether misguided.

For all that, Ryle has provided the sketch-plan of a doctrine of categories which admirably generalizes recent tendencies in both philosophy and logic, the development and examination of which would certainly pay dividends to anyone interested in the central problems of philosophy.

The uncritical character of some of the evidence for many logics is lavishly illustrated in Dr. Waismann's "Language Strata". His theme is that language strata, which are ordinarily distinguished by reference to their subject-matter, can be distinguished "from within", that is, by reference to "formal motifs". But whenever Waismann argues for the peculiarity of a logic, we find that he begs the logical questions. In effect, the leading assumption of "Language Strata" is that there is no independent subject of logic and consequently no such thing as the logical criticism of the presuppositions of "science" and ordinary language. But any scientific fancy, any quirk of language, will do to set up or throw down a logic. I shall mention just one of these.

In his argument for a special logic of "half-faded memory pictures" (p. 21) Waismann assumes that our not being able to remember whether an object was of a certain colour or not and our having no way of settling the issue entails that it is not of-this-colour-or-not, and even entails the existence of a further object, a memory image, which actually is not of-this-colour-or-not and may both be and not be of this colour. These non sequiturs are obscured by appeals to the "practical" and by confusion about the "-ing" and the "-ed". The remark (p. 21) that "if several colours are shown to me which differ only slightly

they do not necessarily exclude one another" only seems to be relevant to the law of excluded middle or the law of contradiction because Waismann fails to distinguish the things that have the colours from the features the colours have. For if, on the one hand, the slight difference of the two colours means that they occupy overlapping places on the scale, then obviously the things that have the one colour will not exclude the things that have the other. If, on the other hand, it means that they occupy exclusive places on the scale, then no matter how slightly they differ (as e.g. when they occupy adjoining places), the things that have the one colour will exclude the things that have the other. In both cases, however, the features of the one colour will intersect with the features of the other; and there only seems to be something in all this that goes against the laws of logic if we fail to make the above-mentioned distinction.

There is no obvious reason for believing that different uses of language require different logics. Human beings engage in many activities other than asserting propositions, and the fact that language can be made a party to these other activities no more requires the postulation of various logics than the existence of these various activities does. In particular, the fact that parts of sentences and whole sentences with a curious "twist" or a curious social impact are not always used in order to assert propositions by no means requires the setting up of a special *logic* of truncated or dismembered propositions or of propositions with a curious twist or curious social impact.

Waismann's account of verifiable statements undermines the whole theory of strata. In verifying a material object statement we are supposed to find that "some lines of verification refer to other material object statements, i.e. they lead from statement to statement within the same language stratum; some others branch off and penetrate into a different stratum, the 'I'-statements" (p. 25). If Waismann had provided examples of such verifications set out in formal detail, it would have become apparent that, in order to get the required connection between what verifies and what is verified, it is necessary to give up the doctrine of language strata and different logics. While there are some important points about the role of ordinary language in Professor Smart's "Theory Construction" (XII), I suspect he would have the same trouble as Waismann about relating various languages.

Linguistic investigations, of the kind illustrated by some of the essays in this collection, could be described as philosophical, and especially logical, experiments. The laboratory work of philosophers and logicians often consists in considering the out-

come of substituting one expression for another in a certain sentence, the possibility of "translating" one sentence into another, and so on. But the results of such experimentation cannot properly be appreciated unless they are incorporated in a systematised set of hypotheses about the "nature of things". The most convenient way of presenting such a set of hypotheses is as a set of logical forms with their deductive and classificatory interrelations. The apparent distaste of the linguistic movement for systematic philosophy developed in close connection with systematic logic is no doubt partly a reaction against the one-sided extensional, truth-functional and predominantly deductive nature of contemporary logical systems. But the movement can hardly be expected to make any enduring contribution to philosophy unless its results are expressed in a detailed and systematic form, in which case, of course, it would be a logical movement rather than a linguistic one.

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 Harvard University Press, 1952. 396 p. \$6.00. (Australia,
 Oxford University Press, 63s.)

That C. S. Peirce (pronounced "purse") was one of America's more impressive intellects is now clear. What is less clear is his stature as a philosopher; and much less so, the way in which his doctrines on various points might best be stated. Like Wittgenstein later in Europe, Peirce was an influential innovator, and before his death he had become the philosophical parent of a vigorous school with which he was not anxious to be identified. Unlike Wittgenstein, he published no book in philosophy proper. At his death, in 1914, he left a number of published papers (many written for a journalist's market) and a mass of unpublished ones, the whole displaying a bewildering variety of idioms and an apparent discord of claims as well. Thus he has become the subject of research and editorial labour. To the six volumes of his *Collected Papers* issued a generation ago by the Harvard Press under editors Hartshorne and Weiss, will presumably be added further volumes under other editorship.

There have been anthologies of selections (e.g., Buchler, Thomas) and single-volume expositions (e.g., Buchler, Feibleman, Gallie). In the present volume we are offered, in response to a sort of challenge by Arthur O. Lovejoy, and under the sponsorship of the Charles S. Peirce Society, a cooperative project in "the study and development of Peirce's ideas" — a step toward bringing "his whole scheme of ideas into clearer focus than he himself ever quite brought it" and toward submitting that scheme to a "methodical and searching criticism" (Foreword p. v). In practice, twenty-four papers by twenty-five contributors have been arranged into four groups, followed by the assemblage of footnotes or tailnotes for the lot, and five short appendices *plus* an index. I shall have some questions to raise concerning the project itself and this way of undertaking it. But first a survey of the contributions.

THE INDIVIDUAL PAPERS — FOURTH GROUP

The fourth and final group of papers is headed "Biographical and Historical", and some readers might well prefer to nose around in this collection first, to get the smell of flesh and blood.

Of two biographical papers one, by co-editor Frederic H. Young, is a brief sketch of Peirce's life, his education, and his philosophical ancestry (briefly, Scotus, Kant and Hegel). The other, by Max H. Fisch and Jackson I. Cope, is a judiciously-detailed and absorbing account of Peirce's stay of five years at the Johns Hopkins University. Then comes a comparison of Peirce and the similarly-neglected innovator in psychology Edmund Montgomery, written by Morris T. Keeton. The comparison is cautious and informative, although more might have been said to identify Montgomery and to show why the comparison is important. Finally James K. Feibleman writes "On the Future of Some of Peirce's Ideas", concluding with the puzzling remark, "If there is anything genuine to them [i.e., to various speculative suggestions made by Peirce] then to that extent we shall be obliged to him for our own future" (p. 334). It is puzzling too that Feibleman should declare with confidence, apparently both for himself and for Peirce: "There is no final knowledge in metaphysics except the proposition that there must be a final metaphysics knowable" (p. 327). *Is* there a sense in which a "final" or "ultimate" metaphysics is conceivable? (Something like this problem is considered by Manley H. Thompson in the second set of papers.) Perhaps "final" or "ultimate" here should be taken merely to suggest the indefinitely revisionist character of good inquiry.

FIRST GROUP.

The book begins with a topic on which Peirce himself might be said to have laboured a good deal, namely "Pragmatism: Peirce's Theory of Meaning." (The term "Pragmatism" was coined by Peirce after James and others had borrowed "Pragmatism".) The title is somewhat pickwickian, for it turns out that several of the contributors in this section regard Peirce as having held more than one theory; and much of the work here concerns Peirce's obscurities and variations of phrase. In a way, the first two papers are the easiest to recommend, forming as they do a short symposium, with Arthur O. Lovejoy attacking each of seven formulations which he offers for Peirce's "pragmatist theorem", and Justus Buchler answering in Peirce's defense. Admirers of G. E. Moore may find Lovejoy's performance a piece of virtuosity and a delight, but they will also find much of Buchler's reply authoritative and convincing. For example: Lovejoy (p. 16) attacks Peirce's famous dictum that our conception of an object contains nothing but "the effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, [that] we conceive the object . . . to have". Lovejoy reasons (a) that in perceiving an object or conceiving a class of objects we need not be aware of *all* the sensible qualities, and (b) that our conception is not formed merely of those "having practical bearings". Buchler's reply is that criticism (b) cannot be urged, because it presupposes that in Peirce's own terminology "sensible effects" stands to "effects conceivably having practical bearings" as genus to species, whereas the terms are actually synonymous (p. 30). This shifts the issue to (a), which Buchler does not take up, perhaps because Peirce was plainly defining "object", not in terms of all the sensible effects the object actually has, or all it could have, but in terms of all we conceive it to have, in conceiving it. The other matters of dispute include Peirce's definition of "belief", and his notion of future reference and of the "function" of a concept.

There is an overlapping of problems in the six papers, and I mention only briefly the remaining four essays. Daniel J. Bronstein suggests a way of putting some order into Peirce by tracing modifications in the "pragmatic maxim"; and comments upon Peirce's "realism", his "conditional idealism", his notion that subjunctive conditionals are irreducible, and what Bronstein calls his "correspondence theory" of truth. Winston H. F. Barnes outlines four interpretations of Peirce's pragmatic "principle" and of the two which he regards as best — both as theories and as interpretations of Peirce — he favours (on both counts) the

one which he labels the "conceptual pragmatic" one. (Barnes here has much in common with C. I. Lewis.) W. B. Gallie is concerned with a slightly different ambiguity in pragmatism. He distinguishes James's wider criterion of meaning from the narrower one which Peirce himself came to prefer in taking scientific discourse as his model. Gallie then examines two classes of recalcitrant expressions, proper names and vague (actually or prospectively imprecise) predicates, and finds Peirce more acceptable and up-to-date concerning the latter than the former. He brings a good paper to an excellent conclusion with his analysis of Peirce's Logical Realism. The final paper, by George Gentry, is an orderly but difficult exposition of some of the most recondite things Peirce ever wrote, on "habit" and "interpreters". Gentry adds to an already strong case for distinguishing, in Peirce, earlier and later theories.

On most counts this group of papers is the best. Most of them are fairly readable and careful and frank about the impossible. Yet of the six writers, it is interesting that Gallie alone stands up to Peirce in anything like the way a British reader might expect a present-day philosopher to do. Many of the others appear not to have questioned that there must be a single criterion of meaningfulness suitable for all of the aims Peirce had.

SECOND GROUP.

Under the heading "Common-Sense, Science and Logic", the second set of papers commences with an exposition by Roderick M. Chisholm of "what might be called Peirce's basic view of knowledge and inquiry". This one is, I should say, the most winsome and stimulating piece in the volume. It might well have been the first in a symposium, in order that the reader might learn in a straightforward way where, if at all, other contributors would take exception to what Chisholm writes, and if so, why. There is little point in my attempting a summary of the paper. Its merit lies partly in the way it is organized and phrased, sentence by sentence, and in the contextual naturalness which it provides for dicta from Peirce. Unlike most of the book, it will do much to convince a sceptical reader that Peirce is worth all the fuss.

It is natural to find that most of the other six papers deal with material which Chisholm has introduced. Arthur Smullyan traces in Peirce, and supports, the doctrine that there are "universal presuppositions", common to all inquiry (or "almost all", p. 120). He suggests that in this we have a doctrine as

fruitful as Peirce's pragmatism. (On page 111 Smullyan is unclear in defining "presupposition" — on the one hand declining to speak of *logical* relation between propositions, and on the other speaking in terms of premises.) Thomas A. Goudge develops abstruse and fragmentary technicalities in Peirce, concerning types of abstractive operations. Obscurity here may, perhaps, be set down to compression. Manley H. Thompson argues that Peirce's "realism" eschews whatever is ultimately unknowable, yet in at least an early version requires (what cannot be known) that communal inquiry will continue indefinitely or forever. (Can this latter even be conceived?) Thompson suggests that the paradox could be resolved by regarding the second of these two things as tenable, not in science, nor in metaphysics, but in a "study of the ultimate ends of action" (p. 142). (But Peirce himself is cagey about "the ultimate ends of action", and the dissolution will work for you only if you are willing to take a lot for granted. How could we tell whether there are such ends or not, and how would we know one if we found it?) There is a terse paper by co-editor Philip P. Wiener on an important topic: evolutionary theories and Peirce's interpretations of the history of science. Wiener observes that "we cannot understand the vast sweep of [Peirce's] philosophical writings unless we realize that he tried persistently and desperately, especially after Darwin's work appeared, to weld rigorous scientific logic to a cosmic evolutionism which would make room for freedom of the individual will and religious values" (p. 143). Next, George D. W. Berry discusses Peirce's notable contributions to the logic of statements and of quantifiers, and suggests that Peirce may have rivalled Boole or Schroeder. In the last paper of the set, Paul Weiss undertakes to develop and illustrate Peirce's theory of "abduction", i.e., of the non-deductive and non-inductive kind of thinking by which we get new ideas or concepts. (As Weiss puts it, it is a somewhat regular *kind* of process which in each instance is creative.) Here is a fluent job, although the illustrative material is not always adequate for the generalizations offered, and there are some undesirable ellipses of expression (e.g., on p. 178, "a satisfactory hypothesis should be readily refutable").

THIRD GROUP

I have left till last the seven papers in the third group, under the general head "Phenomenology, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion". Here more than elsewhere the average philosophical reader is likely to part company with the specialist who is interested in Peirce for research: for here it becomes painfully

difficult to say whether the obscurity is due the more to infelicity and opaqueness in the essays, or to Peirce's failure to work his material into shape. Yet the contributions are not uniform in this, and it must be confessed that usually the concern is with material in Peirce on which it would be difficult to agree how to talk. One recalls that Hartshorne and Weiss said, in their introduction to volume one of the *Collected Papers*, "When Peirce's thought is at its best, he writes least well"!

First, David Savan sets out to "examine Peirce's derivation of his categories [Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness] in his paper of 1867; to consider some of the philosophical implications . . . [drawn] in the three papers of 1868; to indicate some difficulties . . . ; and to suggest that his approach . . . in the 90's came about in part (and only in part) in answer to these difficulties". This is a big order to fill in nine pages, and it is not surprising that Savan suffers from compression, and fills the first part of his order (chiefly on Peirce's divergence from Kant) more than he does the other three quarters.

Miss Isabel S. Stearns, in the way she begins the next essay, seems about to give the categories a clarification. But instead of separating and then relating the different things Peirce says about each of them, and thus producing a plausible single interpretation (which she seems to think possible), she succeeds, with some cloudy phrasing and a variety of quotations, in giving the impression that Peirce was very nearly all over the place. I shall later compare the ways in which various contributors characterize Firstness, for example. But in any case it is rather too disarming of Miss Stearns to say that Firstness is the "most elusive" of Peirce's categories, and then to write: "It is the principle of freshness, spontaneity and variety, the character of the Kantian sense-manifold, and also that of primordial originality. At the same time it possesses a 'may-be' character, which belongs to the mere idea unrealized." (p. 199).

Herbert Schneider uses his five pages to argue that Peirce's three categories are an incomplete list, and that there are grounds for another, of Fourthness, the normative notion of "vital importance". This, Schneider argues, is not identical with a *summum bonum* or any form of "logicality", which Peirce sometimes views as a rigorous kind of quasi-ethics. The "grounds" which Schneider adduces are partly some things which Peirce said — despite his apparent conviction that three categories were enough (for what?) — and partly the nature of the discursive activities in which Peirce was obviously interested.

Much the most searching inquiry into what Peirce meant by Firstness is made by Charles Hartshorne. Hartshorne argues (a) that Peirce was right (despite a criticism by Dewey and notwithstanding Moore's distinction between the sensation and the blueness) in equating "feeling" with "potential feeling" and "feeling-quality"; (b) that Firstness is relatively absolute and not absolutely so (Peirce's rejection of Determinism is discussed here); and (c) that Firstness or "the Monad" is unlike the traditional Deity in being pure possibility, not pure actuality (Peirce is said here to have the superior view). In this paper one finds provocations as well as dark spots. For example: "We arrive at the nonrelative by abstracting from relations; we arrive at the possible in just the same way." And: "The nonrelative is in principle less, not more, than the relative, as the possible is less than the actual." (Both p. 221.)

The paper by William Reese is again difficult. Reese sets his purpose thus: "to demonstrate that the modern doctrines of philosophical realism have a logical power capable of solving certain long-standing conceptual perplexities, and that the basic tenets of Whitehead and Peirce—despite their differences—tend toward agreement upon a 'full-blown' realism which at the same time preserves whatever basic insight philosophical nominalism may possess". How can a demonstration be so provisional? Then there are problems of detail—e.g., "Whatever is needed to explicate reality must be granted a place in reality; this is the important principle of philosophic realism" (p. 229). But now, what is the puzzle about reality, a puzzle about? And what would it be like to "explicate" reality? (See Sterns, p. 205.)

On realism once more: Charles K. (not Richard) McKeon examines Peirce's belief that he was deriving his realism from Scotus, and weighs Peirce's realism (an "extreme" one) for its adequacy. McKeon argues that while there is clearly an historical debt, and while Peirce resembles Scotus, there are also differences, for example in Peirce's notions of individuality (individuals?) as unreal, of natural laws as subsistent, and of universal mind as a substratum; and these differences are associated with inadequacies in Peirce's theory. Here I find the going quite rough. The following—I think none the worse for excision from context—is a conservative sample: "But if law is not merely a name, perhaps also a concrete thing is not merely individual; this does not, however, imply that individuality may not be the final perfection of the total individual-nonindividual composite" (p. 250). In the exposition of Scotus, illustrative material is as meagre as it should have been abundant. For there has to be

something to assure the reader that he is not caught in a sort of crossword puzzle.

Finally John E. Smith starts soundly enough: "Surveyed in its wholeness the philosophy of C. S. Peirce is at best an enigma." The style here is fresh and accessible. In the philosophy of religion, Peirce took the view that religion arises neither in reason (proof) nor in mere emotion, but in "direct awareness" and "instinct" common to all men. As Smith points out, on this showing reason is slighted. Smith also notes that Peirce, in his non-sectarian opinions, scarcely recognized how deep the schisms reach. But Smith seems not to notice that Peirce was surprisingly unempirical about "instinct"; that Peirce's gratitude to organized religion for its cultural services in the past is bad inductive ground for supporting it in the present or future; and that there may be a verbal sleight-of-hand in Peirce's crediting religion with a concern for the "vital" issues. In theology proper, Peirce's "Neglected Argument" is analyzed. It is an appeal to instinctive belief arising in "musement," plus a couple of more theoretical additions. Here Smith does not ask how Peirce's neo-orthodoxy (as we might now say) will bear the strain of certain other things which he maintained — e.g., that the success of science makes probable a world-mind analogous to our own, that the question whether there really is a God is the question whether Socrates and Confucius and other prophets discovered Truth, and that God is the Truth at the centre of the universe. What Smith does make fairly clear, however, is that Peirce debased theology to a sort of organizational "platform", and did not direct into its domain his search for "scientific" knowledge.

COMMENT ON THE BOOK

Now consider the book as a whole. When Lovejoy wrote to the Secretary of the Peirce Society suggesting a cooperative volume to put Peirce's work into a clearer focus and to give it a "most thorough critical examination", he observed that the task would not be easy. The editors go on to say, in their Foreword, that twenty-six Peirce scholars were solicited for essays without prescription of topic (two were obliged by other commitments to decline), and that the resulting papers — by no means surveying all of the "vast reaches of Peirce's prolific work" — were found to fall naturally into the four divisions noted. The editors remark: "That a book of this scope and quality should be offered to the philosophic and cultural world by a Society born as recently as 1946, is an achievement of which its membership may well be proud."

One looks upon this satisfaction with reservations. I am not raising the question, unanswered by the editors, how many of the papers are actually ascribable to the Society's existence. I am asking, how good is the book?

In its favour: it presents some scholarship; it will be useful, for a time at least, to those at work on interpretations and criticisms of Peirce; and it achieves some measure of provisional agreement on the problems for example, whether Peirce had a single consistent theory of meaning or of truth, and whether he said enough to offer a clear doctrine about evolution, natural laws, and the ultimate knowability of the order of nature. In short, the book's merit is its scholarship, however provisional and dry it may be.

But in other respects the book is unsatisfactory. For one thing, it misses each of two possible targets. Some papers presuppose readers with quite technical interest and grounding in the writings of a philosopher whose reasons for not publishing a coherent major work of his own seem quite apparent; while several of the remaining papers take for granted readers with little scholarly interest and, in some cases, with rather little critical perception. Was it, then, aimed at readers who would themselves be doing research in Peirce, or was it aimed at simply "the philosophic and cultural world"? If the latter, most of the volume does not communicate; if the former, it seeks a limited public who must consider it heterogeneous and lamentably short of definitive. As a try at both markets, it is an uneasy compromise.

For another thing, the book as a whole does not measure up to the best standards of philosophical writing. Too much of it is laborious, jargonized, abstract and dry.

Finally, the "most thorough critical examination" is not achieved. This is Lovejoy's phrase, and it is true that he suggested that "internal" criticism should be stressed. But he also suggested that Peirce's philosophy as a whole, or system, should be brought into clear focus. And given the results between these two covers, the evidence would *seem* to be that internal criticism and clear focus are not achievable together. If the evidence is misleading, the execution of the project is inferior. Or, if the evidence is acceptable, then this statement of purpose should have been omitted. In any case, once a critical project of this sort is undertaken, two requirements ought to be met: (a) the contributors ought first of all to agree on interpretation and exposition — or where this is not attainable, they ought to explain wherein it is not; and (b) the evaluation ought then, upon that foundation, to be more searching, less in awe of Peirce's specu-

lativeness and his penchant for coining jargon, and less tolerant of the myth that criticism can remain "internal".

Consider the actual performance of the book in treating, for example, Peirce's category of Firstness. Admittedly certain misgivings are expressed: the category is highly elusive (Stearns p. 199 and Keeton p. 323); it appears to have "both a formal and a material reference" and these function in different ways (Stearns p. 200); it was given incompatible descriptions by Peirce at different times (Savan p. 193); and anyway there is a problem in trying to say that Firstness is a real constituent of the universe (Bronstein p. 48). But we are told next to nothing about why Peirce ever offered any categories at all. (For more definite hints of this we must enter the maze of Peirce's writings, or look elsewhere, e.g., in Gallie's book, ch. 8.) Nor are we given reason to believe that the attempt is feasible even in principle. Then, as characterizations of Firstness we find a puzzling variety: Firstness is actual existence (Bronstein p. 48), yet it is feeling, feeling-quality, potential feeling, and possibility, with a "may-be" character (Savan p. 193, Stearns p. 199, Hartshorne p. 215); it is identifiable with feeling before the latter is introspected (Stearns p. 199), yet it is the capability of being known by sense-perception (McKeon p. 245), and it roughly corresponds to what Gotshalk has called "the objective" (Schneider p. 213); it is the absolutely singular (Stearns p. 199); it has the status of a dream (Stearns p. 201); it is the Monad (Hartshorne p. 215); it is mind or chance (Keeton p. 317). And so it goes. Would it be too much to say that something better than this should have been managed?

Peirce himself remarked, in a foreword to a book-manuscript which he did not finish or publish: "My book will have no instruction to impart to anybody. Like a mathematical treatise, it will suggest certain ideas and certain reasons for holding them true; but then, if you accept them, it must be because you like my reasons, and the responsibility lies with you." (*Collected Papers*, vol. I, p. xi)

The volume might have been much improved by a firmer editorial policy, for example in producing symposia throughout — symposia for which some of the present papers might well have been useful in preliminary correspondence between symposiasts. It would also have been an improvement, in a work whose footnotes are often crucial, had they been footnotes and not notes assembled at the back of the book.

REVIEW

FAITH AND LOGIC. Edited by Basil Mitchell. London: Allen and Unwin, 1957. v, 222 p. 21s. (U.K.).

This is a collection of essays which arose out of the discussions of a group of Oxford philosophers and theologians. The contributors are Basil Mitchell, Austin Farrer, I. M. Crombie, G. C. Stead, J. R. Lucas, R. M. Hare and M. B. Foster. The essays are of the same *genre* as Flew and MacIntyre's recent *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*; they discuss the bearing of modern Oxford Philosophy on Christianity, and therefore start with problems of the *meaning* of religious assertions. Unlike the earlier book, however, these authors are all Christians (and, incidentally, Anglicans).

The book contains some things of interest to philosophers who are not particularly concerned with philosophical theology. J. R. Lucas on "The Soul" has vigorous criticisms of Ryle's *Concept of Mind*. Most important here, perhaps, is M. B. Foster's "'We' in Modern Philosophy", which raises some important questions about the presuppositions of linguistic analysis.

Naturally, though, its main importance is in the realm of philosophical theology. Here it may prove disappointing to some, and exciting to others. Disappointing, because there are few brand-new arguments or sweeping generalisations; exciting, because of the care and candour and thoroughness of the discussion, and the increasing clarity which results. Highway-building is less romantic than trail-blazing; but it also has its rewards.

Whatever may be thought of the satisfactoriness of the answers, there is here no evasion of the problems. It is *orthodox* Christianity which these seven writers are concerned to defend and explain. They dismiss, for example, all views (whether expounded by critics or believers) which deny "that the Christian religion involves anything that may fairly be called factual beliefs about a transcendent being" (p. 31). This lands them in familiar difficulties of two general sorts, relating (a) to the subject and (b) to the predicates of religious statements: (a) "God" appears to be, in Crombie's phrase, "an improper proper name". That is, statements about Him do not reduce to statements about something else, such as human ideals (as, e.g.,

statements about the Average Taxpayer reduce to others about individual human beings); while on the other hand, He cannot be pointed out to anyone as can be ordinary bearers of proper names. (b) Assertions *about* Him, e.g., that He loves us, or that He created the world, seem dubious, because (i) they claim to be factual, yet it appears that no observations would be allowed to falsify them; and (ii) if we cannot know what "God" means, how could we learn what these predicates mean when applied to Him?

It may be useful to partly sketch Crombie's answer to these problems in Chapter II ("The Possibility of Theological Statements"), because it bears directly on recent discussions. "The inquirer may learn from the paradoxical features of theological statements that, if they are about anything, they are about a mystery" (p. 34). This is a point on which religious believers themselves have insisted, apart from all philosophical considerations. He then replies to the difficulties mentioned above by arguing that "the anomalous formal properties of theological statements help to fix the reference of these statements" (p. 48): i.e., the difficulties may be shown to flow necessarily from what the believer wants to say; they are what would have to be said about (and help to fix the meaning of) a "transcendent being". The believer is *as* justified in using them as he is in believing in a mystery beyond experience.

To indicate this mystery further, he argues, we need a "concept of the divine". This is "indeed in one sense an empty notion; but it is the notion of a complement which could fill in certain deficiencies in our experience" (p. 56). We must proceed by a process of taking concepts we can grasp (e.g., "person" as opposed to "thing") and extending them, in one sense incomprehensibly, but yet "in a determinate direction" (p. 58) (so we may arrive at, e.g., "pure spirit"). These are not just category mistakes, but deliberate *category-transgressions*, "committed to express what we" (i.e. believers) "antecedently feel" (p. 61); and they are therefore not meaningless.

The worth of the book however, is not only, or chiefly, shown in discussion of such now standard topics. Above all the *logical variety* of religious language is brought out. To lump together, for example, "God loves all men", and "Christ is of one substance with the Father", as if they both, being "religious assertions", must have the same logic, should be henceforth impossible. Hence the "problem of the meaning of religious statements" dissolves into an indefinite number of problems about the meaning of *particular* religious statements. The result seems to be that much of the fine pioneer work, such as Wisdom's "Gods" (and a lot of

what has been written since, too) is virtually obsolescent. Henceforth philosophers in this field must dine with the theologians before they criticise them; and perhaps it will be good for them both.

If these discussions start with the *meaning* of religious assertions, what is their connection with the traditional philosophic job of arguing for or against God's existence? With the exception perhaps of Hare (see pp. 190-3), the authors' answer is clear. This is the job of revelation. Natural theology, as traditionally conceived, has set itself an impossible task. The only "warrant for religious belief", as Crombie puts it, is to find "within the space-time world, persons or events whom one is impelled to treat as having a divine origin" (p. 68). The nature of this argument is carefully and illuminatingly examined (see, e.g., Chap. III). But on the dismissal of natural theology, I would like to make one brief, and therefore dogmatic, suggestion.

The central problem of traditional metaphysics is, I believe: "what sort of ultimate answer must we give when we consider the nature of the world?"; or, if this sounds too vague: "with what sort of remark must explanation ultimately stop?" (*Ordinary* explanation never stops, except for practical purposes, because the terms used can always themselves be required to be explained.) There are two great alternative approaches. The first is to consider what would be that of which it would not make sense to ask for a further explanation; and one famous answer to this question is in terms of Necessary Being. The second alternative is to argue, usually from the peculiarities of such ultimate answers (the sort of peculiarities which Crombie brings out), that the whole search is *logically* improper; and that explanations therefore *necessarily* stop with the everyday sort we already know how to give. This later alternative has many versions, of varying impressiveness, from Hume and the Kant of the first Critique to Professor Anderson and standard Linguistic Analysis.

Now these present authors' combination of a critical metaphysic (or anti-metaphysic) with a careful and reasoned defence of revelation is a thoroughly defensible position. But is theism so easily divorced from constructive metaphysics? For *one* logical role that the concept of God has always played (even when He was naively conceived as the particular Spirit who spoke out of the cloud on Mt. Sinai) is to be the ultimate end of explanation. This suggests two things. The first is that Crombie's paradoxes about transcendent being may be illuminated by comparing them with the metaphysical quest. But secondly, if we boldly challenge the ogre of the category mistake with the new incantation of

category-transgression, could this not lead to an attack on critical restrictions on metaphysics as such? And might it not then be argued that the mere rational drive for an ultimate stopping-place for explanation could provide such a justification for category-transgressions as these authors find only in revelation? The future developments of linguistic analysis should be interesting.

R. L. FRANKLIN.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention in this list neither precludes nor guarantees later review.)

BAHADUR, His Highness Chamarajendra Wadiyar. Dattatreya. With an introduction by S. Radhakrishnan. London, Allen and Unwin, 1957. viii, 285 p. 21s. (U.K.).

"In the philosophy of this great Indian teacher (Dattatreya) can be seen the spirit of synthesis of Indian philosophy and the confluence of the religions of Brahma, Visnu and Mahesvara which developed in India as rival cults. The author gives an acute exposition of Vedantic Absolutism, based upon the traditional teachings of Dattatreya's philosophy and his own extensive learning and deep devotion." (Dust-jacket).

The author, who is Governor of Mysore and Chancellor of its university, has included in his book translations of a number of important ancient texts.

BLYTH, John W. A modern introduction to logic. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1957. 426 p. \$5.50.

BROWN, G. Spencer. Probability and scientific inference. London, Longmans, Green, 1957. 149 p. 31/9 (Aust.).

The latter two-thirds of this book contain the reflections on randomness by the aid of which the author claims to show that the statistical evidence for various hypotheses in psychical research is no evidence at all.

CAMPBELL, C. A. On Selfhood and Godhood. (The Gifford Lectures delivered at St. Andrews, 1953-55, revised and expanded). London, Allen and Unwin, 1957. xxxvi, 436 p. 35s. (U.K.).

This book has two parts, corresponding to the two series of lectures. The first deals with the nature of the self and reaches a "substantial" view of it, which makes sense of a good deal of theological talk about "soul"; the second deals with the nature and validity of religion and religious experience, and maintains that only a symbolic interpretation of theism will do as a theoretical expression of the religious consciousness. Some of the arguments for the positions defended in the second part are, however, to be found in the first. There are four appendices, of which one is a detailed reply to Nowell-Smith's criticism, in his Pelican *Ethics*, of Campbell's theory of free will. An analytical table of contents is a useful guide to the thread of the argument. A.K.S.

CONNOLLY, F. G. Science versus philosophy. New York, The Philosophical Library, 1956, 90 p. \$3.75.

"The author, an associate professor at the University of Notre Dame . . . reappraises the various fields of human knowledge in the light of the profound changes which have taken place since the days of Thomas Aquinas." (Dust-jacket).

CROSSER, Paul K. Economic Fictions. A critique of subjectivistic economic theory. New York, The Philosophical Library, 1957. 318 p. \$4.75.

Under the slogan of "hypotheses non fingo" the author roughly handles Manger, Wieser, Boehm-Bawerk, Clark, Jevons, Schumpeter, Keynes and Spann for basing their work on "an *as if* conception of reality." (Dust-jacket).

DAVIS, George W. Existentialism and theology. New York, The Philosophical Library, 1957. 85 p. \$2.75.

A (sympathetic) "investigation of the contribution of Rudolf Bultmann to theological thought". (Dust-jacket).

EVANS-WENTZ, W. Y. The Tibetan Book of the Dead, or the after-death experiences on the *Bardo* plane, according to Lama Kagi-Dawa-Samdup's English rendering. London, Oxford University Press, 1957. 249 p. 46/6 (Aust.).

To this third edition Dr. C. J. Jung has contributed a Psychological Commentary, Lama Angarika Govinda an Introductory Foreword, and Dr. Evans-Wentz an additional Preface.

FANG, Thomé H. The Chinese view of life. Hongkong, The Union Press, 1957. v, 274 p. U.S. \$2.50 or £1 Stg.

The author of this book is Professor of Philosophy at National Taiwan University. The book grew out of broadcast lectures given in Nanking in 1937, two months before the Japanese invasion, but has been substantially re-written for the English-speaking world, in the attempt to help to bring about "a sympathetic understanding of Chinese mentality". The author warns us, however, that: "There are ample grounds for doubting the possibility of conveying the exact meaning of Chinese philosophical thought through the medium of English"; but in spite of this he is not unsuccessful in presenting "a systematic interpretation of those ideals that have been effective in the shaping of Chinese culture". Professor Fang shows himself familiar with Western literature and philosophy, ancient and modern, and, especially in his first chapter ("Chinese wisdom—a vindication of Comprehensive Harmony"), develops his subject in its relation with recent Western thought. A.K.S.

GROTIUS, Hugo. Prolegomena to the law of war and peace. Translated by F. W. Kelsey, with an introduction by E. Dumbauld. New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1957. 43 p. 50 cents (U.S.A.) (paper cover.)

HEATH, Spencer. Citadel, market and altar; emerging society. Baltimore, The Science of Society Foundation, Inc., 1957. 243 p. \$6.00.

This is an "outline of socionomy, the new natural science of society". In the light of a "single simple law" governing the proper functioning of any form of organisation, "the author sets out the nature and autonomous operation of the evolving free society, its unique function and transcendent powers, and how its modern market technology of free enterprise can provide public as well as private services at a profit (in place of chronic debts and deficits) through free contractual engagements." (Dust-jacket).

KANT, Immanuel. Perpetual peace. Edited, with an introduction, by Lewis White Beck. New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1957. 59 p. 50 cents (paper-bound).

A complete revised version of a translation previously published by the editor.

KNIGHT, Everett W. Literature considered as philosophy—the French example. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. xvi, 240 p. 25s. (U.K.)

This book, whose author is a member of the Department of French at Glasgow University, is a study of the existentialist "movement", not only in the writings of "philosophers who are also novelists and play-

wrights" (like Sartre or Gabriel Marcel) but in "a literature, of which no one speaks in connection with existentialism, which, nevertheless, is existentialist in that it is *literature as philosophy*". The authors of this literature are "as much philosophers as the above-mentioned philosophers are novelists and playwrights", and include such writers as Gide, Malraux and Saint-Exupéry, each of whom is here studied in detail.

"Existentialism reduces life from what we would like it to be to what it is", distinguishing "what really is from what human ingenuity has created to explain the nature of the universe and to justify man's presence in it"; so any writer "who refuses to allow a faith, a hope or a theory to interfere with his work is also a metaphysician". Existentialism is also "an effort to tear philosophy way from its contemplation of an order that does not exist, so that it may participate in the confusion that does; it is the substitution of a living ambiguity for a dead absolute".

The study of contemporary French writers is introduced by an examination of the phenomenology of Husserl, who "believed that intelligibility is not the goal of thought, but the condition of its possibility".

There is a useful select (but extensive) bibliography of phenomenological and existentialist books. A. K. S.

LOEHRICH, Rolf R. *Modus Operandi, the methods of philosophical engagements*. Illinois, The Compass Press, 1957. 112 p. \$4.75.

An unusual book, in execrable English, about the methods of resolving disputes in philosophy, with special and detailed reference to the ordinary-language philosophers.

MASCALL, E. L. *Words and images. A study in theological discourse*. London, Longmans, Green, 1957. 126 p. 15/6 (Aust.).

Defends Christianity against logical positivist and affiliated later critics.

MACKINNON, D. M. *A study in ethical theory*. London, A. and C. Black, 1957. vii, 280 p. 21s. (U.K.).

After an introductory chapter on the nature of "the sorts of activity we call moral philosophy", Professor Mackinnon discusses some main types of ethical theory, as found especially in the Utilitarians, Kant, Butler and Hegel, with particular attention to "the roles which have been assigned to epistemology by writers on moral theory". Prichard and Moore are well in the picture, and there are chapters on moral freedom and on the relation of ethics to politics, metaphysics, and religion; nothing, however, about what goes on in Oxford to-day. A distinctive and original treatment. A.K.S.

PASSMORE, J. A. *A hundred years of philosophy*. London, Duckworth, 1957. 508 p. 35s. (U.K.).

The author is Reader in Philosophy at the Australian National University. "Starting with J. S. Mill, he carries his survey down to embrace logical positivism, semantics, existentialism, and other present-day ferments. For reasons of economy he restricts "philosophy" to epistemology, logic, and metaphysics: and writes, as he is bound to do, mainly from an English point of view, covering only those American and Continental philosophers whose ideas are part of the public domain of philosophical discussion in Great Britain." (Publisher's Brochure).

PAUL, Leslie. *Nature into history*. London, Faber and Faber, 1957. 201 p. 21s. (U.K.).

"The effort to show that history is inexplicable unless we accept that man moves in a spiritual dimension which the animal does not and cannot share, and in which nature provides nothing for man, but man himself must create and invent all, led Mr. Paul into a fascinating investigation of the most primitive and remote societies and their social and ethical and technical achievements." (Dust-jacket).

RUNES, Dagobert. *A book of contemplation*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1957. 149 p. \$3.00.

A collection of unrelated aphorisms or "thoughts", arranged in alphabetical order under key words, of which the following may serve as examples:

"Ethics: If you failed to learn ethics at six, you will not learn it at sixty."

"Evolution: If man is the royal crown of creation, I am an anarchist."

"Hero worship has an uncanny tendency to choose scoundrels as the object of adulation."

"Tomorrow: If tomorrow were never to come, it would not be worth living today."

RUSSELL, Bertrand. *Why I am not a Christian*. Edited, with an Introduction and an Appendix, by Paul Edwards, and with a Preface by the author. London, Allen and Unwin, 1957. xii, 225 p. 16s. (U.K.).

Professor Edwards deserves our thanks for collecting from scattered and largely inaccessible sources eight papers by Russell on religion (including the famous Third Programme debate with Father Coplestone on the existence of God), and seven others on related subjects (including a very early one, hitherto unpublished, in which his revolt against Hegelianism first appears).

Russell's cogent, witty and economical, yet graceful, writing makes these pieces a delight to read. But, more importantly, they are still badly needed as secularist ammunition in defence of freedom and toleration in the religious field, as Professor Edwards demonstrates in his introduction by reference to recent happenings in America and, to a lesser extent, in Britain. (It would show a rash complacency to assume that there is no similar threat in Australia.)

Not the least valuable contribution to this book is the Appendix, in which Professor Edwards gives a detailed, well-documented and altogether shocking account of how Russell was prevented from taking up his appointment in 1940 as Professor of Philosophy at the College of the City of New York.

The titles of the essays are: *Why I am not a Christian*; *Has religion made useful contribution to civilization?*; *What I believe*; *Do we survive death?*; *Seems, Madam? Nay, it is*; *On Catholic and Protestant Sceptics*; *Life in the middle ages*; *The fate of Thomas Paine*; *Nice People*; *The new generation*; *Our sexual ethics*; *Freedom and the Colleges*; *The existence of God—a debate*; *Can religion cure our troubles?*; *Religion and Morals*. A. K. S.

SESONSKE, Alexander. Value and obligation. The foundations of an empiricist ethical theory. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 1-124. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957. \$2.50.

"The task I have undertaken in this study is to outline an ethical theory that combines, or has its roots in, both of what I take to be the two main streams of twentieth-century moral philosophy—pragmatism and the analytic movement" (Toulmin, Baier, Hare, etc.). (Introduction, p. 4).

SMITH, J. W. Theme for reason. Princeton University Press, 1957. 215 p. \$4.00.

Philosophers have assumed that "reasonable men" say or assume that "we must either show that what we say is a theorem deducible from assumed axioms and postulates, or we must show that what we say is made probable by evidence . . . This book is at heart an attack upon the idea that rationality requires any such straitjacket." (Dust-jacket).

The author develops his theme successively in politics, ethics and philosophy in general.

SUPPES, Patrick. Introduction to logic. Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1957. \$5.50.

THOMAS, J. Heywood. Subjectivity and paradox. A study of Kierkegaard. Oxford, Blackwell, 1957. 174 p. 18s. (U.K.).

Kierkegaard historically placed, and interpreted with the somewhat surprising help of Moore, Waissman, Toulmin, etc.

WAIN, John. Preliminary essays. London, Macmillan and Co., 1957. x, 196 p. 18/9 (Aust.).

Collected essays on literary subjects (e.g. "Restoration Comedy and its modern critics", "The quality of Arnold Bennett", "The reputation of Ezra Pound"). Readers of this *Journal* might find a special interest in "The literary critic in the University", and in Mr. Wain's arguments in support of the view that a poet should aim at a small audience.

WARNER, Samuel J. The urge to mass destruction. New York, Grune and Stratton, 1957. 173 p. \$3.50.

"Outlines clearly the close parallelism that exists between the genesis, dynamics, and operations of human destructiveness seen in patients undergoing psychotherapy, those in the life and philosophy of Nietzsche, and in the concept of Satan. This relation . . . permits the formulation of principles which may be applied as well to the threat of mass destruction on the larger social scale." (Dust-jacket).

WARRENDER, Howard. The political philosophy of Hobbes; his theory of obligation. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957. 337 p. 68s. (Aust.).

WOLFENSTEIN, Martha. Disaster. A psychological essay. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul (The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction), 1957. 221 p. 23s. (U.K.).

"This is a study of how people react to large-scale disasters . . . The materials on which this is mainly based were gathered by field teams in recent peacetime disasters, particularly tornadoes. . . . The author . . . begins with an analysis of attitudes towards remote threats and proceeds through the moment of impact of a disaster to the range of after-effects." (Dust-jacket).

NOTES AND NEWS

AUSTRALASIAN ASSOCIATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY ANNUAL CONGRESS, 1957

The Congress and Annual General Meeting for 1957 were held in Sydney from 19th to 23rd August. The programme was as follows:

Monday, August 19th:

7.30 p.m.—Presidential Address: Professor John Anderson, "Philosophy as Realism".

Tuesday, August 20th:

10.00 a.m.—Mr. L. Goddard, "'True' and 'Provable' in a Gödelian Context".

2.00 p.m.—Council Meeting.

7.30 p.m.—Mr. G. Buchdahl, "Collingwood and his Critics".

Wednesday, August 21st:

10.00 a.m.—Dr. A. M. Ritchie, "Minds or Men?"

2.00 p.m.—Mr. C. F. Presley, "The Interpretation of Truth-Functional Constants".

7.30 p.m.—Mr. E. Kamenka, "Karl Marx and the logic of Utopias".

Thursday, August 22nd:

10.00 a.m.—Mr. D. M. Armstrong, "Absolute and Relative Motion".

2.00 p.m.—Mr. R. D. Bradley and Mr. A. Burns, "Free-will — Problem or Pseudo-Problem?"

7.30 p.m.—Party.

Friday, August 23rd:

10.00 a.m.—Discussion, opened by Professor D. Gasking, on "Free-will and Predictability".

Owing to unexpected changes in import control regulations, the regular cover paper has not been available for covering this issue of the *Journal*, and the nearest available substitute has been used. However, the Association has been successful in procuring a special import licence which it is hoped will make it possible to return to the usual cover paper for the May number and succeeding numbers.

EXTRAORDINARY GENERAL MEETING

The Executive of the Association has decided to call an extraordinary general meeting to consider the following Special Resolutions, of which notice has been received:

1. That the following motion carried at the 1957 annual general meeting be rescinded: "that subject to confirmation on the legal points involved, the Association resolve by Special Resolution to alter the name of the Association to be 'The Australasian Association of Philosophy'; and that, in the event of this involving legal difficulties, the Secretary be asked to put the matter on the business paper for the next annual general meeting." Moved by Professor A. K. Stout, seconded by Professor J. J. C. Smart.
2. That the name of the Association be altered to be "The Australasian Association of Philosophy". Moved by Professor A. K. Stout, seconded by Professor J. J. C. Smart.

The meeting will be held at 5.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 4th March, 1958, in the philosophy lecture room at the University of Sydney.

In accordance with articles 23-25 of the Articles of Association, votes may be given by proxy, the proxy to be appointed in writing under the hand of the appointer, in the following form:

The Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy.

I,

of
being a member of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy and entitled to vote hereby appoint.....

.....
of
as my proxy to vote for me and on my behalf at the extraordinary general meeting of the Association to be held on the fourth day of March, 1958, and at any adjournment thereof.

As witness my hand this.....

day of

Signed by the said.....

in the presence of.....

D. C. STOVE,
(Honorary General Secretary,
Australasian Association of
Psychology and Philosophy).

